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Abstract 
In the context of Canadian policymaking, the alleged ‘punitive turn’ demonstrated 
by the Harper government from 2006-2015 was extraordinary. Under this turn, 
punitiveness coincided with a rejection of empirical evidence (Kelly and Puddister, 2017; 
Doob and Webster, 2015 2016; Marshall, 2015; Newell, 2013 Mallea, 2010). The 
controversial bill, the Safe Streets and Communities Act, has been regarded as one of the 
most poignant examples of this rhetoric (Marshall, 2015; Newell, 2013). This thesis 
investigated the role of evidence and penal populism in policymaking through a content 
analysis of the legislative debates of the SSCA. Drawing on a neo-Weberian framework 
this thesis finds that the motives of state actors may be complex, balancing self interest 
with populism, and concerns for efficiency with moral values (White and Prentice, 2013; 
Stevens, 2011; Zhao, 2009; Faught 2007; Tickamyer, 1981).  
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction  
The Safe Streets and Communities Act was introduced to the House of Commons 
as “Bill C-10” by Conservative Justice Minister Rob Nicholson on September 20th, 2011 
(Barnett et al., 2012). As an omnibus bill, the SSCA contained five parts and nine 
separate bills. The most controversial parts of the bill concerned amendments to the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA). For example, contested changes to the YCJA included major shifts in the legal 
language of the bill, which would re-prioritize the goal of the Crown from the protection 
of the youth offender to the protection of society (Mallea, 2015). Changes to the CDSA 
were significant as they introduced the first ever mandatory minimum sentencing for drug 
crimes (Public Prosecution Service of Canada, 2018). There was a wealth of evidence 
that claimed that the bill would disproportionately impact marginalized populations, such 
as youth, Aboriginals, and women (Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Lau and Martin, 2012; 
The John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012; Jarvis, 2012; The Northwest 
Territories Department of Justice, 2012). The efficiency of the bill’s punitive methods 
was also called into question by many experts. Among these experts were the Canadian 
Bar Association, the Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy, the Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network, and over 500 doctors who signed with the Urban Health Research 
Initiative in a letter objecting to the bill (Jarvis, 2012). The bill was also criticized for 
being unnecessary, as crime rates in Canada had been falling steadily since the 1970s 
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(Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2018). Yet, despite much controversy outside and within 
Parliament, the bill would pass on March 12, 2012, thanks to a Conservative majority. 
The SSCA is significant as it provides a microcosm of the alleged “punitive turn” 
in Canadian criminal policy under Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government from 
2006-2015 (Marshall, 2015; Newell, 2013). The Harper government took a ‘tough on 
crime’ approach, breaking away from a non-partisan history of evidence-based 
rehabilitative measures (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and 
Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 
2014; Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010). This ‘tough on 
crime’ approach coincided with an anti-science rhetoric among the Harper Government, 
in which evidence was rebuked in areas of criminal policy (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; 
Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, 
Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 
2010).  
The call for punitive policy among state actors is linked to the concept of penal 
populism. Penal populism is an attempt to win elections by appealing to voters’ 
frustrations through victim advocacy, without concern for the true effectiveness of such 
policies (Pratt, 2007; Simon, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003; Garland, 2001). Prior to 2006, 
literature contends that Canada constructed social and political barricades against the 
globalizing effects of US-based penal populism. This immunity is referred to as Canadian 
exceptionalism, a discourse of the “Canadian way” of doing justice premised on peace 
and fairness (Pratt, 2007; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005:8; Roberts et al., 2003).  Therefore, 
Canada had deliberately avoided being ‘like the US’ by staying away from penal 
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populism and insisting on evidence-based methods which were proven and fair (Pratt, 
2007; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Roberts et al., 2003). Why did the Conservative 
government decide to break with the non-partisan tradition of evidence-based and fair 
policy, in favour of punitive populism?  
Theories of the state attempt to understand the policy choices of state actors. Neo-
Weberian theories of the state describe state actors as self-interested; politicians act in a 
manner that they believe will gain them electoral votes (Stevens, 2011; Saks, 2010; Zhao, 
2009; Tickamyer; 1981). In this same neo-Weberian vein, literature suggests that state 
actors are also guided by their own values and beliefs (Adams and Saks, 2018; White and 
Prentice, 2013; Zhao, 2009; Faught, 2007). This suggests that state actors may support 
the punitive SSCA, regardless of the evidence, influenced by their own goals, interests, 
and values (Adams and Saks, 2018; White and Prentice, 2013; Stevens, 2011; Saks, 
2010; Zhao, 2009; Faught, 2007; Tickamyer; 1981).  
Through neo-Weberian theory, this thesis examines the legislative debates of the 
SSCA to discover how criminal and drug policy debates are framed, specifically 
pertaining to the role of evidence and experts in policymaking (Manning, 2006). Using 
retrospective qualitative content analysis, this thesis analyzed records of legislative 
debates to explore the rationales and arguments utilized by both the legislation’s 
supporters and detractors. For the research to develop inductively, it was led by the 
general research question:  What rationales did state actors provide, and what symbolic 
frames did they draw on, in legislative debates on the SSCA? Guided by this research 
question, the thesis examines the role of the state and state actors in the process of 
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policymaking through an examination of legislative debates surrounding the passing of 
the SSCA.  
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 will review the 
literature, beginning with sociological studies on the role of the state. I argue that neo-
Weberian theories are particularly helpful in explaining the role of the state in terms of 
the SSCA. The literature review will also describe the use of evidence in policymaking in 
Canada, and the impacts of penal populism and Canadian exceptionalism in Canada. 
Lastly, the specific context of the Harper government and the SSCA concerning these 
topics will be further discussed. Next, in Chapter 3, the methods will discuss the process 
of the qualitative content analysis of the legislative debates. The methodological 
framework will be described, as well as the strengths and limitations of this approach. 
Chapter 4 presents the results. In this chapter, the most common frames utilized by those 
who support and object to the SSCA are outlined. This section will highlight how frames 
are often used by state actors to support or challenge legislation. I find that opposition 
members defend a systemic view of crime, while supporters insist on an individualistic 
view of crime. Lastly, the discussion in Chapter 5 will put the results into the context of 
neo-Weberian theory to explore why state actors may promote certain rationales over 
others. The limitations and possible areas for future research are also discussed in this 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Literature Review 
This chapter will provide an overview of the literature which relates to this thesis. 
The literature review will begin with a discussion of the various sociological theories of 
the state. Next, the neo-Weberian and Weberian theoretical framework of this thesis will 
be contextualized. The following sections will review the alleged ‘punitive turn’ of the 
federal government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Within this section, the 
influence of penal populism and state paternalism in Canadian policymaking will be 
defined. Also included in this section will be an overview of the history of evidence-
based policy in Canada, including the alleged changes to evidence under the Harper 
government. With context situated by the literature, the significance of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act will be introduced.  
2.1 Theoretical views of the state 
Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Foucault, and Mills offer different frameworks for the 
sociological study of the state and state actors. For Émile Durkheim, new divisions within 
the state created after industrialization allowed for the development of modernity and 
rationality (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 11). Under Durkheim’s functionalist perspective, 
the state and society both progressed on forward trajectories (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983).  
This view, critics say, is inflexible to the vast differences among nation-states, and 
although Durkheim agrees that societies may differ, he insisted that all states governed in 
a similar manner (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). Additionally, Durkheim’s functionalist 
perspective of the progressively evolving state has little empirical merit and fails to 
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critically analyze complex power relations (Saks, 2010; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). 
Therefore, Durkheim could not capture the complex nature of states and state actors.  
Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of the state offer a more critical approach but 
still fail to capture many nuances of the state (Saks, 2010; Amenta, 2005; Badie and 
Birnbaum, 1983). For Karl Marx, political and legal superstructures are founded on the 
economic structure of a given society (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Marx, 1970). 
However, Marx allows for a state which may act autonomously from the economic 
structure. The state takes various forms and roles among different capitalist countries. 
These differences may be explained by the unique histories of each specific state (Badie 
and Birnbaum, 1983; Marx, 1973). However, this nuance can be lost in most 
contemporary neo-Marxist theories of the state. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum 
(1983) critique Marxist theories of the state. While some of these theories allow for 
autonomy, many reduce state actors to being only a “loyal agent of the capital” (Badie 
and Birnbaum, 1983:3). Elizabeth Clemens labels these theories as “instrumentalist” as 
they describe the state and state actors as only behaving as an instrument of the bourgeois 
class (Clemens 2016: 90).  These ‘instrumentalist’ theories have also been criticized for 
offering little empirical basis for their arguments (Clemens, 2016; Saks, 2010; Amenta, 
2005; Skocpol, 1985).  
Similarly, theories of C. Wright Mills suggest that elite networks spanning 
various social institutions (such as business, government and military) decided social 
policy (Mills, 1956; Clemens, 2016). In analyzing the work of Mills and his 
contemporaries, Clemens (2016), like Mike Saks (2016), asserts that these theories do 
little to describe the real social processes located in state government. Thusly, Clemens 
7 
 
argues, these theories have left the actions and motivations of state actors as a “black 
box” (2016: 89).  
The work of Michel Foucault offers a more complex view of the state. For 
Foucault, the state is not a monolithic entity, but rather it is a system of intertwined actors 
and institutions (Sawyer, 2015). This differs from the Marxist perspective which sees the 
state as an all-encompassing apparatus of the powerful. For Foucault, political power 
extends far beyond the state, and into institutions such as the family, the medical field, 
and prisons (Sawyer, 2015). Foucault describes a modern state which no longer relies on 
the use of physical force, but instead is concerned with the management and control of 
populations through bio-power (Clemens, 2016; Drake, 2010; Foucault, 2010, Curtis, 
2001). Biopower can be described as the focus on the regulation and management of 
biological processes, such as birth rates and death rates (Drake, 2010). Foucault theorizes 
that the populous serves as a political object, wherein statistical data serve as information 
used to control and shape populations (Curtis, 2001). This is what Foucault refers to as 
the “governmentalization of the state”, the process in which expert knowledge is used to 
maximize the efficiency of a population (Drake, 2010:47, Curtis, 2001). Frameworks of 
normative behaviour in state-run areas are shaped by this expert knowledge (Drake, 
2010). Individuals who fall outside these ideological frameworks of normative behaviour 
are disciplined in society through disciplinary power (Drake, 2010). Disciplinary power 
is carried out through institutions of law and health, such as prisons and psychiatric 
facilities. Through disciplinary power, the practise of self-regulation, or governmentality, 
emerges (Drake, 2010).   
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Although Foucault’s theories have been helpful in many critical examinations of 
policymaking, there were several reasons why these theories were not chosen for this 
thesis.  For Foucault, the state relies on expert knowledge to create the most efficient 
form of governance (Drake, 2010). However, the Safe Streets and Communities Act was 
passed despite a wealth of expert knowledge which contradicted its efficiency (Azzie, 
2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Cunningham, 
2014; Lau and Martin, 2012; Jarvis, 2012; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and 
Latimer, 2012; The Northwest Territories Department of Justice, 2012). Therefore, 
Foucauldian theory may be of limited applicability in this context. Secondly, in 
describing sociological theories of the state, Tracey L. Adams and Mike Saks (2018) 
assert that Foucauldian theory fails to probe the actions of state actors beyond the 
influence of governmentality. They assign a goal to policy makers (enhancing 
governmentality) without directly analyzing the actions and interests of state actors. 
Lastly, when examining the relationship between professions and the state, Saks (2010) 
and Adams and Saks (2018) find that tautological theorizing denies state actors 
autonomy. 
When examining the founders of sociological thought, Weber was perhaps the 
most influential in the development of state sociology and political sociology (Berg and 
Janoski, 2005; Amenta, 2005; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983).  Weberian theory views the 
state as central to explaining the structure of society, and not just an apparatus or 
instrument to the elite (Amenta, 2005).  Moreover, Weber encourages researchers to 
focus on what state actors do, rather than focusing on the outcomes of their activity (such 
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as capitalist power and governmentality).  Therefore, Weberian theory was best-suited for 
undertaking the analysis of state debates in this thesis.  
In his most well-known contribution to state-sociology, Weber offers that the state 
is an organization with a monopoly on violence, within a given territory (Clemens, 2016: 
90; Weber, 1965). For Weber, the monopoly on violence allows the state to maintain 
legal order over its citizens (Dowe and Hughes, 1986). Weber’s definition may still 
describe most modern states, but it leaves a considerable amount of the state undescribed 
(Clemens, 2016; Amenta, 2005; Nettle, 1968). The neo-Weberian theory of Edwin 
Amenta (2005) builds on Weber’s definition. Amenta outlines a neo-Weberian model 
which describes the state as “a set of organizations, but with unique functions and 
missions” (Amenta, 2005:96). This state operates under the rule of rationality and 
bureaucracy (Clemens, 2016; Amenta, 2005). However, the state is different from any 
other bureaucratic organization because it holds legitimate authority over the use of 
violence in specified territory (Amenta, 2005). Weber’s three forms of legitimate 
authority explain how the state retains the exclusive right of violence (Weber, 1965). The 
first form of legitimate authority is traditional rule (Berg and Janoski, 2005; Weber, 
2007). The most classic example of traditional authority is a monarchy (Dowse and 
Hughes, 1983).  The second type of legitimate authority is rational-legal, in which power 
is given by a specific legal process (Berg and Janoski, 2005; Weber, 2007). An example 
of such authority would be Canada’s own parliamentary democracy. Lastly is charismatic 
power, where an outstanding characteristic or attribute bestows an individual with power 
(Berg and Janoski, 2005; Weber, 2007). History provides many examples of such leaders, 
from Martin Luther King Jr. to Adolf Hitler (Dowse and Hughes, 1983).  
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Other neo-Weberian theorists offer similar theories on the state. J.P. Nettl (1968) 
and Clemens (2016) expand on the Weberian concept of the state by arguing that the 
unique cultural and historical backgrounds of a territory shape a state. Clemens defines 
nation-states as “territorially bounded entities that join a cultural framework of 
membership” (2016: 26). Similarly, Nettl describes a state as a collective of “functions 
and structures” which are shaped by the specific history, cultural norms, and constructs of 
belonging of a given territory (Clemens, 2016:90; Nettl, 1968:562).  From these 
definitions, the cultural make-up of a state is described as vital to the way in which a state 
is organized and operates. 
Contemporary Weberian theory approaches state actors differently, allowing for a 
more autonomous role. State actors act and operate in their own interests, as well as the 
interests of others (Adams and Saks, 2018; Clemens, 2016; Saks, 2010). Neo-Weberian 
theories allow for empirically based explanations of power and social exclusion (Adams 
and Saks, 2018; Saks, 2010). These theories also analyze the justifications underlying 
state actors’ activity, through concepts such as rationality and values. Thusly, neo-
Weberian theory was chosen as the theoretical framework for this thesis. This framework 
helped to describe the role of state actors in Canadian criminal policymaking.  
2.2 Weber and Neo-Weberian theory  
According to Weber, processes of rationalization guide the actions of individuals 
(Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006). Weber believed that the very purpose of sociology was to 
interpret and explain social action (Anter, 2014; Breen; 2012; Morrison, 2006 Weber, 
2007).  Social actions were described by Weber as social behaviour that is perceived to 
be “subjectively meaningful” by actors. Society at its essence was made up of this 
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‘meaningful’ social action, and everything contained within society could be reduced to 
social action between actors (Anter, 2014; Weber, 2007: 7). According to Andreas 
Anter’s interpretation of Weber’s “Basic Sociological Concepts”, the state can therefore 
be reduced to a series of “individual steps from ‘action’ to ‘state’” (Anter, 2014:85; 
Weber, 2007). When broken down to its very core, society and its institutions are nothing 
more than series of social actions between people.  
Rationality for Weber is situated in specific values; although numerous forms of 
rationality may exist, Weberian scholars highlight three. The first is formal rationality, 
which is based on values of efficiency, control, and routine (Breen, 2012: 9; Morrison, 
2006; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954).  For Weber, formal rationality is the ruling logic 
of capitalist society and the form of rationality most utilized by the state (Breen, 2012; 
Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954). Next is substantive rationality. This can 
be described as rationality which is premised on pursuing a value or a system of values 
for its own sake (Kalberg, 1980; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954). Such values may be 
based on religious or a spiritually, tradition, or even justice (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 
2006; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954).  Lastly, is theoretical rationality, which is based in 
values of science and intellect (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). However, 
unlike the other two forms of rationality, theoretical rationality is not directly related to 
any type of social action, as it is a cognitive process (Breen, 2012).   
There are two ideal types of rational social actions according to Weber, 
instrumental-rational (or rational legal) and value-rational (Breen, 2012; Rheinstein, 
1954). Instrumental-rational action is premised on calculated decisions based on the most 
efficient means to achieve an end (Breen, 2012: 10; Morrison, 2006: 359; Weber, 2007; 
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Rheinstein, 1954). In this type, social actors carefully consider the consequences of their 
decisions before acting. This includes the consequences that come from other social 
actors (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954). Instrumental-rational action is 
guided by formal rationality. It is shaped by an individual’s assessment of what they 
believe is the most efficient action. Therefore, this type of social action is based on the 
specific situated knowledge of a social actor (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007).    
Secondly, value-rational social action is based solely on acting on a value “for its 
own sake” (Breen, 2012: 10; Morrison, 2006: 359; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954). This 
value can be based on “duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call or the 
importance of some cause…” (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007:40; Rheinstein, 1954). In 
this type of social action, the value is perceived as more important than a successful 
outcome (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007; Rheinstein, 1954). This type of 
action is less concerned with weighing the options to choose the best means but is instead 
focused on pursuing a specific value (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). 
Efficiency and success are still considered but are a much lower priority than pursuing 
the value itself (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). Value-rational social action is based in 
substantive rationality, as it is premised on obtaining a value (Breen, 2012; Weber, 2007; 
Rheinstein, 1954).  
Weber also describes two ideal types of non-rational social action. They are 
affectual social action (based off emotions) and traditional social action (based on habit 
of everyday life). (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). In affectual social action, 
there is no rational calculation to a means or an end, as the response is triggered by 
emotions (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). Lastly, traditional social action describes the 
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everyday rituals and daily habits of life. This type of social action is repeated so 
frequently, it becomes automatic (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007).  
Weber also addressed the impacts of bureaucracy on the state. Weber viewed the 
state as a set of administrative bureaucratic institutions (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). 
Within the state bureaucracy, legitimate authority is achieved through legal means, with 
laws which bestow the state offices and actors with administrative powers (Morrison, 
2006; Weber, 2007).  To remain efficient, individuals within the state bureaucracy govern 
using formal rationality (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). Under this formal rationality, 
state actors are concerned with achieving the most efficient means to the most efficient 
ends (Morrison, 2006).  Experts within the state bureaucracy tend to be guided by formal 
rationality and seek to adopt the best means to achieve the desired ends (Morrison, 2006; 
Weber, 2007).  
However, the state, according to Weber, is not shaped only by bureaucracy 
(Morrison, 2006). Weber described the “levelling effect of bureaucracy” or the 
conformity of some social norms within the state bureaucracy (Morrison, 2006:385; 
Weber, 2007). This process is a result of democratic principles, which dictate that the 
state must be representative of its populous (Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007). Such 
“levelling” of bureaucracy could mean the incorporation of public opinion and public 
consensus in policy, and a demand for a more inclusive and open society (Morrison, 
2006; Weber, 2007). This concept demonstrates how value-rational action, guided by 
substantive rationality, can become incorporated into public policy, even under a state 
bureaucracy (Morrison, 2006). Therefore, Weber explains how a state’s policy may be 
shaped by different rationalities.  
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Regarding state actors, Weber believed that state actors rationalized their actions 
like any other social actor (Weber, 2007). The same social processes that motivated other 
actors in their social actions, were also present in the state actor (Weber, 2007) Building 
on Weber’s Politics as Vocation, Ann R. Tickamyer argues that state actors will act in 
their own self-interest to advance their career (Tickamyer, 1981; Weber, 1946). This self-
interest is not innate to only politicians, but instead applies to most professionals (Saks, 
2010; Tickamyer, 1981; Weber, 1946). However, most sociological literature on state 
actors and politics misses the complexity of state actors in general (Adams and Saks, 
2018; Saks, 2010; Tickamyer, 1981). Adams and Saks (2018) suggest that state actors 
can be self-interested, and that their own desires and biases shape their decision-making. 
Stevens (2011) describes civil servants in the UK as self-motivated, seeking career 
advancement by promoting “totemically tough” policies (237). Civil servants often 
selected evidence which aligned with populist ideologies to impress superiors but failed 
to advocate for policy which they believed would be effective (Stevens, 2011).  
Neo-Weberian theory also aids in explaining the role of evidence in 
policymaking. Dingxin Zhao (2009) modifies Weber’s three types of state legitimacy 
(charismatic, legal-rational, and traditional) to analyze how legitimate authority has 
shaped the political landscape in Chinese politics.  Traditional legitimacy is modified 
with ideological legitimacy “to include any value-based justifications of the state power” 
(418). Ideological legitimacy is defined by Zhao as the state’s right to rule based on 
values, such as political philosophies, religion, or tradition. Ideological legitimacy also 
replaces charismatic legitimacy. Zhao justifies this decision in claiming that charismatic 
legitimacy is an “extreme form” of ideological legitimacy (418). Legal-rational 
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legitimacy is unmodified, defined for Zhao as “legally” elected state power (418). Lastly, 
Zhao creates a new type of legitimate state power, performance legitimacy, where the 
“state’s right to rule is justified by its economic and/or moral performance” (418). For 
Zhao, performance legitimacy is an “evaluative process” in which the electorate judges 
the legitimacy of the state, relying on “common-sense” values (418). Thusly, ideological 
legitimacy is based on the evaluation of the electorate’s values (Zhao, 2009).  
The neo-Weberian theories of Zhao (2009) and Tickamyer (1981) highlight the 
motivated self-interest of state actors to remain in power and to keep their jobs. 
Additionally, as suggested by Zhao, state actors are driven by ideological party lines and 
their own ideologies about crime. State actors also anticipate the ideologies of their 
electoral base (Zhao, 2009). In this way, state actors are guided by not only their own 
professional rationality, but also by their own values, and the perceived values of the 
electorate (Zhao, 2009; see also Faught 2007).  
Similarly, although not neo-Weberian theorists, White and Prentice (2013) claim 
that state actors support ‘bad’ policies to uphold their cultural and gendered values. In 
interpreting evidence-based arguments for early childhood education, experts were often 
over-shadowed by normative arguments surrounding families and parenting (White and 
Prentice, 2013).  These findings, like Adams and Saks (2018), Stevens (2011), and Saks 
(2010) suggest that state actors adopt or cater to the normative beliefs of voters to keep 
themselves elected.   
Based on this literature review, self-interested state actors may promote policies 
to win votes (White and Prentice, 2013; Stevens, 2011; Zhao, 2009; Tickamyer’s, 1981). 
Additionally, state actors prioritize policy based on their own political or cultural beliefs 
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on a given issue (Zhao, 2009; Faught, 2007). Therefore, there may be more to state actors 
than interests of capital or governmentality. The complex role of state actors may have 
been underestimated in previous literature (Adams and Saks, 2018; Saks, 2010).  This 
thesis addresses this gap, guided by neo-Weberian theory, to analyze the activity of state 
actors.  
2.3. A “Punitive Turn”: Canada Before and During the Harper 
Government 
 In this section, literature which analyzed the ‘punitive turn’ under the Harper 
government from 2006-2015 will be discussed. This literature argues that the federal 
government made an “unprecedented” punitive turn in Canadian policymaking from 
2006-2015. This turn was marked by the adoption of penal populist rhetoric, and a 
rejection of evidence (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and 
Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 
2014; Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010) 
2.3.1 Penal Populism  
Penal populism can be described as: “the pursuit of a set of penal policies to win votes 
rather than to reduce crime rates or promote justice” (Roberts et al, 2003: 5). However, 
penal populism is different than populism in general, as it represents more than what is 
popular among voters (Pratt, 2007). For John Pratt, penal populism is unique as it taps 
into the “anger, disenchantment, and disillusionment” of the public (2007:12). This anger 
stems from the belief that the criminal justice system is more sensitive to the rights of 
criminals than to the rights of victims and citizens (Pratt, 2007).  
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Research has explored the impact of penal populism in governance. Jonathan 
Simon (2007) argues that within the American justice system, the state is not simply 
“governing crime” but is instead “governing around crime” (4). Simon suggests that 
criminal justice governance is omnipresent in all institutions in American society. Crime 
has become a “significant strategic issue” and crime prevention a focus of governance 
(Simon, 2007:4).  Using penal populism, state actors expand their governance, control 
and power, in part through a focus on victims -- the “common person whose needs and 
capacities define the mission of representative government” (2007:19).  David Garland 
makes a similar argument of control and crime in the UK and the US. He describes a 
“radical shift” in the 1980s in American and British society (3). Under this new form of 
social organization, there is a new political and cultural order, which Garland refers to as 
the “crime complex” (2001:139). Culturally, citizens become adjusted to living in a world 
in which crime is a social fact, as seen with the rise of private security. Politically, 
policymaking under this new social order is “politicized and populist” (Garland, 
2001:13). State actors rely on the rhetoric of individualism to amp up punitiveness in 
criminal policies. Garland (2001) too argues that state actors evoke emotional appeals for 
victims. Under the new order, acting on the behalf of victims and their families becomes 
a legitimate justification for punitiveness. Simon (2007) and Garland’s (2001) 
conceptions of penal populism align with Pratt (2007), who describe punitive populism as 
a form of ‘victim advocacy’ which addresses the public’s anger.  
Up to 2006, research suggested Canada had avoided US-based penal populism 
(Pratt, 2007; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Roberts et al., 2003). For Pratt, Canada has 
social barriers which have protected against punitive policies; the most notable barrier 
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being the unique “political determination” of Canada to separate itself from the harsh 
justice system in the US (2007: 155). Additional barriers were the impact of French 
liberalism, the separation of justice into provincial and federal responsibility, and the 
journalistic integrity of news organizations (Pratt, 2007).  Roberts et al. posit that penal 
populism had a “muted” influence on the “policy of restraint” in Canada as compared to 
other Westernized countries such as the UK and the US (2003: 39). Roberts et al. (2003) 
and Meyer and O’Malley (2005) also suggested that the unique discourse of Canadian 
justice prevented penal populism from taking hold.   
According to Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl M. Webster (2015 & 2016), 
throughout Canada’s history, there has been a political non-partisan consensus on how 
Canada’s criminal justice system should be governed. This consensus was based around 
four pillars: the importance of social conditions, the ineffectiveness of harsh punishments 
to reduce crime, the development of criminal justice policies by expert knowledge, and 
lastly that policy should address real problems (2015).  However, this consensus ended in 
2006 with the election of Harper’s minority federal government. Since 2006, the shift has 
been to penal populism (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob 
and Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; 
Cunningham, 2014; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010). This ‘punitive turn’ 
was drastically influenced by shifts in the Canadian political discourse, most notably, the 
disassociation of experts and evidence in policymaking (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; 
Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, 
Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; 
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Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010). Subsequently, the focus of policymaking shifted to the 
individual responsibility of criminals and punitive measures (Doob and Webster, 2016).  
James B. Kelly and Kate Puddister (2017) also demonstrate evidence of the 
punitive turn. Their study examines the “unprecedented” amount of private member bills 
passed by the Harper Government (407). By the end of the Harper era, the federal 
government had passed more private member legislation than the previous Chrétien and 
Martin governments. These private member bills mostly regarded matters of public 
policy. This was different than most private member bills passed by previous federal 
governments, which were mostly concerned with “matters of… renaming or establishing 
national days of remembrance” (Kelly and Puddister, 2017: 393). Among the 
“unprecedented” amount of bills, 20 were concerned directly with criminal justice policy, 
or 32 percent of all private member bills passed. Conservative MPs introduced 17 out of 
the 20 of the bills. Historically, this was unheard of. From 1910-2015, only 33 private 
member bills concerning criminal justice were passed. In 105 years, 61 percent of private 
member crime bills were passed under Harper’s federal government (Kelly and Puddister, 
2017). The passing of such a substantial number of criminal justice bills is 
“unprecedented” in the context of Canadian history, making Harper’s government “a 
criminal justice policy outlier” (Kelly and Puddister, 2017: 407).  
The frequent use of private member bills has additional significance to the 
‘punitive turn’ (Kelly and Puddister, 2017). Private member bills are not reviewed by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for constitutionality. For Kelly and Puddister, this was a 
“back door” attempt to force through punitive crime legislation which may have not 
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otherwise passed, such as bills which included mandatory minimum sentencing 
(2017:404).  
Kelly and Puddister also assert that the Harper Conservatives utilized penal 
populist rhetoric not only in the content of bills themselves, but in the naming of the bills. 
The authors examined the naming of such Conservative bills as: “C-36 (Serious Time for 
the Most Serious Crime Act)” (2017:407). The authors compared these titles to criminal 
justice bills which were passed under the Liberal Chrétien government, such as “C-17 
(An Act to amend the Criminal code and certain other Acts)” (407). By using such 
punitive rhetoric, the government attempts to identify themselves as the “law and order 
party” (18).  Similar themes are seen in Paula Mallea (2010), who argued the Harper 
government enforced their own brand of penal populism while appealing to voters’ fears. 
This was achieved through theatrical language. For example, bills were named as if they 
were repairing an unsafe society, as evidenced with the title: “Safe Streets and 
Communities Act” (Mallea, 2010).  
Other recent literature agrees that Harper’s government did utilize punitive 
rhetoric. However, this literature also suggests that there has been little change to 
incarceration rates which correlate with punitive government policy (Goodman and 
Dawe, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015). These authors note that the new punitive policies 
have only been in place for a relatively short period of time, and the effects may not yet 
be seen in empirical work (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015). 
Regardless, this shift in rhetoric itself was important, especially in the context of studies 
such as Kelly and Puddister (2017) who offered evidence for an “unprecedented” shift in 
punitive crime policy (407).  
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To summarize, prior to 2006, studies argued that social and political barricades 
prevented punitiveness from taking hold in Canada (Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Pratt 
2007; Roberts et al, 2003). However, more recent literature documents a clear turn to the 
punitive between 2006 and 2015, evident in the practices and policies of the federal 
Conservative Government (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob 
and Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; 
Cunningham, 2014; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010).  
2.3.2 State Paternalism  
According to Pat O’Malley, punitive penal policy and state paternalism are 
intertwined. O’Malley argues that paradoxical measures respecting both rehabilitation 
and punishment found in the modern penal system can be explained by the “contradictory 
elements of New Right politics” (1999: 175).  The paradox of the “New Right” is 
contained in the blend between “nostalgic” neo-conservatism and “innovative” neo-
liberalism. Within the realm of “neo-conservative nostalgia”, he argues, states act in a 
paternalistic manner to support punitive criminal justice policies to protect the public 
(O’Malley, 1999: 189).  
Paternalism can be simply defined as “the interference by some outside agent in a 
person’s freedom for the latter’s own good” (Le Grand and New, 2015: 17). State 
paternalism refers to the concept of the state which protects individuals from self-harm 
“whether they like it or not” (Feinberg, 1971: 105). According to Joel Feinberg (1971), 
this concept can be likened to parents who interfere with their child’s free will to protect 
them.  Under this logic, the state sees itself as the “permanent guardian” of its citizens, 
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and to act in loco parentis, or in the place of the parent (Feinberg, 1971: 105).  Line 
Beauchesne offers a more nuanced definition of state paternalism, in an examination of 
Canada’s drug policy: “…one of the government’s roles is to protect non-independent 
persons, without questioning what constitutes a non-independent person or the meaning 
of the word protection…” (2000). Through this definition, the “protection” of those who 
are perceived to be “non-independent” or vulnerable is paramount in state paternalism 
(Kilty, 2014; Beauchesne, 2000). However, the Canadian state can be uncritical when 
deciding who needs protection, what these protections should mean, and outcomes of 
their application (Beauchesne, 2000). When considering these definitions together, state 
paternalism plays the role of “Mom and Dad know best” to protect vulnerable 
populations, without critically considering the consequences of such ‘protection’ (Le 
Grand New, 2015; Beauchesne, 2000; Feinberg, 1971: 105) 
In the context of the Canadian state in general, the Canadian government has had 
a history of paternalism. This is evident in literature surrounding the treatment of 
Indigenous peoples. Most prominent is the Indian Act, in which the rights of Indigenous 
people were rewarded or withheld based on whether the individual demonstrated “good 
moral character” (Henderson, 2006:1; Turpel-Lafond, 1997). Canada’s drug laws have 
also been criticized as being overly paternalistic, with paternalism used “to both protect 
and to prosecute” (Kilty, 2014: 78). These state paternalistic policies (such as the Indian 
Act) have led to staggering inequalities and destruction among these groups (Kilty, 2014).  
Similarly, Beauchesne argues that Canada’s drug prohibition is based in “legal moralism 
and legal paternalism”, in which those struggling with drug abuse issues are blamed, 
shamed, and punished (2000:1) 
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 To conclude, state paternalism has historical roots in Canadian policy, specifically 
criminal and drug policies. Moreover, governments (such as within the US) have used 
state paternalism to justify punitive penal policy (O’Malley, 1999). 
2.3.3 Evidence-based Policy and Politics  
Literature agrees that more often than not, Canadian policy-makers incorporate 
evidence in their policies and take seriously the consideration of evidence in policy-
creation (Waller, 2013; Voyer, 2007; Mintrom, 2007; Cornwell, 2006; and Bonta and 
Cormier; 1999). Evidence-based policy measures in Canadian policy became standard in 
the 1960s, with criminal justice matters catching on to the evidence-based movement in 
1970s (Waller, 2013; Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock, 2007; Mintrom, 2007; Waller, 
1974; Waller and Chan, 1974). Previously, the use of evidence-based methods in Canada 
were limited.  Evidence was included in Canadian policymaking after the social 
development of the world wars (Waller, 2013; Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock, 2007). 
This shift to evidence-based policy mimicked similar shifts in policymaking in the US 
and the UK (Waller, 2013; Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock, 2007). Evidence-based 
movements could also be traced back to the rational and managerial ideologies of social 
management in the early 20th century (Waller, 2013; Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock, 
2007).   In criminal policy, evidence-based movements were posited on a shift from 
deterrence to preventative measures (Waller, 2013; Hughes and Mossman, 2002; 
Cornwell, 2006). During this time, the public were becoming frustrated with the 
inefficiency of the criminal justice system.  Evidence-based methods were employed to 
answer the demands of Canadians. The Uniform Crime Reporting Survey was created in 
the early 1960s, and other emerging social science measures followed (Waller, 2013; 
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Cornwell, 2006). It was during the 1970s that evidence was applied to Canadian prisons, 
and systems of parole and prohibition, as the state attempted to combat recidivism 
(Waller, 2013; Hughes and Mossman, 2002; Cornwell, 2006; Waller, 1974; Waller and 
Chan, 1974). Evidence-based policy measures continued to grow in the 1970s, with the 
creation of several new taskforces and commissions which generated new Canadian-
based research (Waller, 2013; Cornwell, 2006; Waller, 1974).  Policy was also influenced 
by international science, specifically from the UK and the Netherlands (Waller, 2013). 
The influence of evidence led to the abolishment of the death penalty, reforms to the 
Criminal Code, and safety restrictions on fire-arms (Waller, 2013).   
In 1985, Canada faced funding challenges which threatened the future of 
evidence-based methods. Federal cutbacks would see vital criminological research being 
defunded, leaving Canada far behind its international counterparts (Waller, 2013).  
According to Irvin Waller (2013), this lack of funding has continued today. 
Consequently, social science researchers in need of Canadian evidence must rely almost 
exclusively on Statistics Canada, or substitute with international research (Waller, 2013; 
Warburton and Warburton, 2004).  Others such as Cornwell (2006) and Bonta and 
Cormier (1999) disagree with Waller’s claims concerning Canadian policy. These 
sources insist that Canadian criminal justice policy research and application thrived from 
the 1980s onwards (or until the publication of those works). Whereas Voyer (2007) 
asserts that Canadian policy development is “healthy”; the bigger problem for policy-
makers is sorting through almost endless amounts of data.  
This literature provides a somewhat contrasting, but mostly cohesive view of 
Canadian policymaking in terms of incorporation of evidence. It points to a Canadian 
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government which, overall, regularly embraced the balanced use of evidence in policy 
(Waller, 2013; Voyer, 2007; Mintrom, 2007; Cornwell, 2006; and Bonta and Cormier; 
1999). However, several scholars assert that there was a considerable shift when the 
Conservatives took power in 2006; this shift escalated with a Conservative majority win 
in 2011 (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015; Azzie, 2015; Winfield, 
2013).  
In a report on evidence-based policymaking in Canada, Philippe Azzie (2015) 
discussed two perceived changes in the federal government from 2005-2015, which 
coincided with Harper’s government (2006-2015). These changes were: (1) “a lack of 
interest in data”; and (2) “the subordination of evidence to politics” (Azzie, 2015: 6). 
Among areas in which the government treated evidence as unimportant included violent 
crime. Additionally, vital community and social programs were cut.  According to Azzie, 
this led to the interruption of data collection and policy evaluations (2015). Mark 
Winfield (2013) analyzed the denial of expertise and evidence within the Conservative 
government’s environmental policy, after their majority win in 2011. This study 
demonstrated that the federal government under Harper slashed government research 
budgets and restricted the use of non-governmental evidence in policy. The government 
also passed debilitating legislative “reforms” to limit evidence-based practises in 
government procedure, specifically those which evaluated and assessed the federal 
government (Winfield, 2013:202).   
Goodman and Dawe (2017) agree that the Conservative government was in direct 
opposition with most experts and evidence; however, they accuse the government of 
intentionally misusing evidence to disguise their punitive measures as “science” (133). 
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Goodman and Dawe demonstrate how the Conservative government’s objection to 
Vancouver’s safe injection site, Insite, is an example of this strategy. In objecting to the 
site, Conservatives claimed that they were insisting on “tough love” by refusing to 
“enable bad behaviours” (134). The Conservative Government even published an article 
supporting their unempirical ideology in a “fake academic journal” (134). These efforts 
were financially backed by the anti-drug organization the Drug Free America Foundation 
(Goodman and Dawe, 2017: 134; Hyshka et al. 2012). Many critics claimed that this 
misuse of science was “ideology over evidence” (Wodak 2008: 226, as cited in Goodman 
and Dawe, 2017). However, Goodman and Dawe attributed this to the “triumph of 
ideology via the strategic manipulation of evidence” (134). According to Goodman and 
Dawe, the Conservative party under Harper wanted to appear that they were “play[ing] 
the game of science” (134). Conservatives did not always manipulate evidence in their 
policy justifications; however, at times evidence was openly ridiculed, or the topic was 
avoided all together. Goodman and Dawe (2017) suggest that the Conservatives: “happily 
(for their own job security and power) [created] as little as possible room for opponents 
to wage counter-insurgency against their policies and political positions” (137). This is 
consistent with the neo-Weberian authors who insist that politicians’ decisions are shaped 
by what will win them votes, as well as ideology and values (Stevens, 2011; Saks, 2010; 
Zhao, 2009; Tickamyer; 1981). 
The literature demonstrates how the use of evidence in politics may be premised 
on self-interests (Goodman and Dawe 2017; Stevens, 2011; Saks, 2010; Zhao, 2009; 
Tickamyer; 1983). However, the words of PM Harper’s former Chief of Staff, Ian 
Brodie, can further illuminate the sentiment of the government under Harper. These 
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statements were taken from Ian Brodie during a panel discussion on the topic “Does 
Evidence Matter in Policymaking?” in March 2009, after he was no longer employed by 
the Prime Minister (Mallea, 2010; Geddes, 2009):  
On criminal justice policy: “Politically, it helped us tremendously to be attacked 
by [sociologists, criminologists, and defence lawyers] because they are “held in 
lower repute than Conservative politicians… we never really had to engage in the 
question of what the evidence actually shows about various approaches to crime” 
(Mallea, 2010; Geddes, 2009) 
On economic policy: “Despite economic evidence to the contrary, in my view the 
GST cut worked… It worked in the sense that by the end of the ’05-’06 campaign, 
voters identified the Conservative party as the party of lower taxes. It worked in 
the sense that it helped us to win.” 
These quotes demonstrate not only disdain for experts and evidence, but a calculated 
move by the government to improve their image, by rejecting ‘low-status’ social science. 
The quotes suggest that the government may have seen evidence as less consequential 
than what is popular.  It must be acknowledged that these quotes are only from one 
member of Harper’s staff and are anecdotal. Still, Brodie’s comments reveal a disregard 
for evidence from at least one high-powered individual in Harper’s government (Mallea, 
2010). When these statements are taken with other literature which demonstrates anti-
science rhetoric, it becomes clear there was a shift in attitudes within the federal 
government (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and Webster, 
2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; 
Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010).  This aligns with neo-
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Weberian theory, specifically Zhao (2009) and Tickamyer (1981) who propose that 
politicians are self-interested and act to maintain their power.  
Although this thesis focuses on the incorporation or rejection of evidence-based 
measures and experts in policy debates, there are important considerations to the use of 
evidence-based measures in policy. Paul Cairney (2016), Katherine Smith (2013), and 
Michael Yeo (2013) discuss the common false dichotomy between politics and evidence, 
in which the two are often juxtaposed as being at odds with one another. In this false 
narrative, science is cast as the only non-partisan and objective alternative to left-wing or 
right-wing ideologies. Yet, no policy is decided on scientific evidence alone, and policy 
debates are more complicated than a dichotomous battle between evidence and ideology 
(Cairney, 2016; Smith, 2013; Yeo, 2013). Evidence is often used as a political strategy, 
which any state actor may manipulate to their own advantage (Goodman and Dawe, 
2017; Edwards, Gillies, and Horsely, 2016). Even more troublesome, states may insist on 
only ‘hard’ science. Rhetoric surrounding evidence-based measures and ‘hard’ science 
can further exacerbate existing social inequalities in policy by ignoring real-life concerns 
(Edwards, Gillies, and Horsely 2016). 
  These studies advise that when incorporating evidence into policy, the choices of 
state actors are more complicated than whether to include evidence or not. As pointed out 
by Yeo (2012): “evidence must be protected from politics, but politics must also be 
protected from evidence” (296). Reasonably, all evidence is at risk of being politicized. It 
is impossible to separate scientific evidence from the power relations that shape its 
creation and its use.   
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This section discussed the alleged ‘punitive turn’ of the Harper government. Next, 
the specific context of the Safe Streets and Communities Act will be discussed. As will be 
explained, this much-contested act was a microcosm of the punitiveness and evidence 
rejection demonstrated under the Harper Conservatives (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; 
Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, 
Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; 
Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010).   
2.4 The Safe Streets and Communities Act  
 The Safe Streets and Communities Act was an omnibus bill introduced by federal 
justice minister Rob Nicholson in the House of Commons on September 20th, 2011, under 
the name Bill C-10 (Barnett et al., 2012).  When the SSCA was introduced, the bill was 
incredibly controversial, and was met with fierce opposition (Newell, 2013). During 
parliamentary debates, The House of Commons (HOC) and the Senate were presented 
with evidence that the bill would be harmful. Opposition parties attempted to debate, but 
the supporters of the bill failed to engage in discussions outside of “tough on crime” 
rhetoric (Newel, 2013:219). The bill, which was comprised of nine smaller bills, became 
official law on March 13, 2012 (Government of Canada, 2017). The bill was divided into 
five parts (Barnett et al., 2012). Part 1 of the bill pertains to terrorism and amended the 
Criminal Code with the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and the State Immunity Act. 
Next, Part 2 of the bill amended both the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. These amendments included minimum sentences for those charged with 
illicit drug dealing, such as those caught dealing anywhere minors may be present 
(Barnett et al., 2012). Minimum penalties for the production of cannabis were also 
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included (Barnett et al., 2012). Additionally, amendments to the Criminal Code in Part 2 
included mandatory minimums for child sex offenders. Part 3 addressed the Corrections 
and Conditional Release Act and the International Transfer of Offenders Act. The Youth 
Criminal Justice Act was amended in Part 4 to shift the priority of the Crown from the 
youth offender to the protection of society in general (Barnett et al., 2012). Finally, Part 5 
amended the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to protect migrant and immigrant 
workers from human trafficking and other abuses (Barnett et al., 2012).  In this project, 
since I am most interested in criminal and drug policy, Part 2 of Bill C-10 is the most 
relevant as it may include discussions of illicit drug trafficking or illicit drug use. 
However, this thesis examined the entire bill debates, as the various parts of the bill are 
interconnected.  
Upon the SSCA becoming federal law, many provincial organizations and 
governments became concerned with the possible impacts of the omnibus bill. A report 
by The Northwest Territories Department of Justice (2012) examines possible financial 
outcomes from the amendments made to the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and 
Substance Act and the Youth Criminal Justice Act. The report predicts that the most 
significant outcome will be an increase in both the number of prisoners and the length of 
sentences. In another report on possible provincial outcomes, Catherine Latimer and The 
John Howard Society of Manitoba examines the potentially harmful effects the SSCA 
may have on recidivism and the rehabilitation of prisoners (2012). According to the 
report, the SSCA could increase the Manitoban prison population by 25 percent.  The 
report highlights how the SSCA targets Aboriginals, youth, women, the mentally ill, and 
those with drug dependency issues. Similarly, Joshua Lau and Ruth Elwood Martin 
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(2012) establish the mandatory minimums of the SSCA will likely result in negative 
impacts on the physical and mental health of prisoners. The report details how the 
negative impacts on prisoners’ health will be exacerbated in marginalized groups, such as 
youth, Aboriginals, women, and seniors (Lau and Martin, 2012)  
Not only is the SSCA contested by evidence and experts, but it may be 
unconstitutional. Ryan Newell (2013) examined the SSCA in the legal context of the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision on R v Gladue. In this Supreme Court decision, it was 
mandated that judges take into consideration the complex social location of Aboriginals 
when sentencing. Sentencing was to be based on healing and was in part to address the 
over- incarceration of Indigenous peoples. Newell demonstrates that the SSCA violates 
this ruling, arguing that it only recreates the legacy of colonialism in Canada (2013).  
Due to the SSCA’s relatively recent implementation, a literature search turned up 
no studies demonstrating the direct impact of the legislation, so the effects remain 
unsubstantiated. Still, this body of literature highlights the potential catastrophic impact 
of the SSCA on marginalized populations and on the criminal justice system.  It also 
raises questions about debates surrounding the legislation.  If there were so many 
negative arguments against the Safe Streets and Communities Act, what were the 
arguments in favour of it?  On what grounds was it justified? Understanding the rhetoric 
behind the implementation of this law will shed light on criminal and drug legislation 
more broadly, and how controversial legislation is passed.  A review of debates 
surrounding the bill will reveal how Canadian law-makers viewed the legislation, and 
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what impact they believed it would have for vulnerable and marginalized populations, 
and others.  
2.5 Summary 
 In this chapter, different sociological theories of state governance were reviewed. 
Most attention was paid to the neo-Weberian framework, which highlights politicians as 
having a variety of interests, values, and goals which shape their legislative decisions.  
Next, the literature review examined the ‘punitive turn’ under the Harper government 
from 2006-2015. This punitive turn had two major characteristics: the use of penal 
populism, and the rejection of evidence. The highly controversial Safe Streets and 
Communities Act provided a great example of the ‘punitive turn’. Critics warned that the 
bill was too harsh, and that it ignored decades of scientific research which disputed the 
efficiency of tough on crime measures (Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; 
Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; Lau and Martin, 2012; Jarvis, 2012; 
The John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012; The Northwest Territories 
Department of Justice, 2012).  
 This thesis explores why this bill passed in the face of such controversy. More 
specifically, what rationales did Harper’s government use to advance the legislation? This 
thesis will investigate the presence of penal populism and evidence in these rationales.  
Did legislators from other parties draw on evidence, penal populism, or other values?  In 
answering these questions, this thesis will shed light on the circumstances surrounding 
the passage of the SSCA. Moreover, this study will further sociological understanding of 
policymaking and the role of evidence. As pointed out by Adams and Saks (2018), Saks 
(2010), and Tickamyer (1981), there is a lack of literature which discusses state actors as 
33 
 
real, autonomous actors. This has left state actors unexamined and trapped in a 
metaphorical “black box” (Clemens, 2016: 89). This is displayed in the literature 
surrounding the Harper Government and the SSCA. There is little consideration in these 
studies of Conservative state actors. State actors are dismissed as pawns working for the 
elite (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Mallea, 2015; Doob and 
Webster, 2015).  Whether that may be the case or not remains unexplored. This study 
investigated the interests and values of state actors, and how state actors chose to 
prioritize evidence and ideologies of punitiveness in their debates. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research questions  
Drawing on the work of neo-Weberian scholars, my study aims to explain how 
evidence and experts are represented in the legislative debates surrounding the Safe 
Streets and Communities Act. This thesis analyzed records of legislative debates to 
explore the rationales and arguments utilized by both the legislation’s supporters and 
detractors.  The general research question driving data analysis was as follows: What 
rationales did state actors provide, and what symbolic frames did they draw on, in 
legislative debates on the SSCA? Three supplementary research questions were informed 
by the literature review:   
1) How did members of the Conservative party rationalize the bill, and what was 
the role of evidence and penal populist rhetoric in their rationalizations?  
2) In the legislative debates, did the arguments for and against the bill reflect 
legislators’ values, and opinions on what makes an ‘efficient’ justice system?  
3) How are marginalized populations, such as youth and Indigenous populations, 
regarded in the legislative debates?  
Overall, the goal was to shed light on policymaking, and the role of evidence, 
penal populism and other factors in shaping legislative outcomes. 
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3.2 Data  
The data analyzed were the debates in parliament surrounding the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act (SSCA). More specifically, the parliamentary debates which were the 
focus of analysis were the Second reading of the bill in both the House of Commons 
(HOC), from September 21st-28th, 2011, and the Second reading of the Bill in the Senate, 
from December 12th-December 16th, 2011 (Parliament of Canada, 2017B). The Second 
Reading of the bill in both houses was chosen, as it is during this part of the 
policymaking progress when the main intent of a bill is discussed and debated 
(Parliament of Canada, 2017A). At second reading there is considerable debate and 
discussion, wherein all political parties justify their support, or lack thereof, for a bill.  
During the Second Reading in the HOC, the bill would have been in its early stages; 
however, at this stage the major debate around the primary purpose of the bill (or any 
bill) would have been made (Parliament of Canada, 2017A). By the time the bill reached 
the Senate it would be substantially revised.  Looking at the debates here allows a 
consideration of the key concerns and areas of contention surrounding a later version of 
the bill, by different actors.  The purpose of an upper house in the legislative process is to 
provide some ‘sober second thought’ (Parliament of Canada, 2017A).  What senators had 
to say about this controversial legislation will shed additional light on the rationales and 
ideologies invoked by policy makers.  Through this methodology, a fuller picture of the 
bill was obtained, while limiting the wealth of data to more reasonable parameters.  
Certain areas of the SSCA pertained to the subject of drugs and crime more than 
others. Part 2 (which included changes to the Criminal Code and Controlled Drugs and 
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Substances Act) and Part 4 (which included changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act) 
were the most relevant. However, all parts of the bill were included in the study, so the 
full intention behind the SSCA could be better examined.  
The data used in the analysis from both the Senate and The House of Commons 
were taken from Hansard. The data were copied and pasted into a Microsoft Word 
document. In total, there were 488 pages of debates from the time periods chosen. The 
HOC Debates were considerably longer at 367 pages, with the Senate Debates at 121 
pages. The data were analyzed by reading through the debates and taking detailed 
analytic notes (as described in section 3.3).  
3.2 Symbolic Framing  
 This research draws on the methods used in Paul Manning’s (2006) symbolic 
framing theory, which suggested depictions of illicit drugs were constructed in the media 
through symbolic meanings and representations (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Manning, 
2006). These meanings and representations are based in pre-existing social and historical 
inequalities. Therefore, a drug is represented in symbolic frameworks “based on the 
social location of its users” (Haines-Saah et al, 2014:50). For example, the negative 
representation by the media in terms of youth and illicit drugs may be explained by the 
social location of youth as a historically marginalized group (Manning, 2006). This 
relates to my study as I seek to discover how social actors rationalize their arguments for 
or against drug and criminal policy in the SSCA. However, the ways in which symbolic 
frames are utilized in this thesis are different.  As described in the literature review, state 
actors often rely on their own ideologies and values when evaluating a policy (White and 
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Prentice, 2013; Zhao, 2009; Faught, 2007). These belief systems are situated and formed 
within the normative structures of society (White and Prentice, 2013; Zhao, 2009; 
Faught, 2007). In this sense, arguments made by state actors can be viewed as symbolic 
frames reflecting how social actors rationalize drug policy in the SSCA. This framework 
is useful for identifying the themes and rationales within debates on the SSCA, and for 
exploring how evidence is situated in these debates. Incorporating this methodological 
framework allowed for the exploration of the dominant rationales of the SSCA.  
3.3 Methodical Strategy 
The research methodology used in this thesis was a qualitative content analysis of the 
legislative documents. The content of the policy and legal documents were closely 
analyzed to identify dominant symbolic frames and to explore how they are represented 
in the debates.   
In Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy Research, Jane Ritchie and Liz 
Spencer (2002) outline four types of policy analysis: contextual, diagnostic, evaluative, 
and strategic. In contextual policy research, analysis is undertaken in the form of 
discovering attitudes, perceptions, and the overall framework of a policy document (304). 
For this thesis, contextual research was utilized to analyze the main symbolic frames 
found in the policy documents. Ritchie and Spencer (2002) detail the specific ways in 
which to undertake a policy content analysis. The descriptive coding methods of Johnny 
Saldaña (2009) and the symbolic framing methods of Manning (2006) were used to 
supplement the process and to give further structure and guidance when taking notes, 
coding, and analyzing.  
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The steps I used in my research are, in order from the first step to the last:  
1. Familiarization 
2. Identifying Symbolic Frameworks  
3. Indexing  
4. Interpretation  
3.3.1 Familiarization  
 In the first stage, the familiarization stage, the researcher must submerge 
themselves in the data. According to Ritchie and Spencer (2002), the level of immersion 
will depend greatly on the nature of the research. Saldaña (2009) advised that the reading 
of the data should be completed two full times or in two passes, each time taking rigorous 
and descriptive notes.  Due to the volume of the data and the time constraints of a 
master’s thesis, one full pass of the parliamentary debate data was made. To compensate 
for this, very detailed notes, or descriptive notes, were taken on the parliamentary 
debates, and these notes were themselves examined in another full pass. At this stage, 
emerging symbolic frames were highlighted as they appeared in this data and in the 
descriptive notes.  
3.3.2 Identifying Thematic Framework  
 Next, is identifying (or coding) the thematic framework. However, this section 
was amended as suggested in Ritchie and Spencer (2002). This methodological 
framework is meant to be flexible and subjective.  At this stage, the descriptive notes 
were re-examined in order to identify the key symbolic frames, as done by Manning 
(2006). When assessing the symbolic frames in a media content analysis, Manning 
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assessed the symbolic frames first in the literature, and then in the content analyzed. This 
is similar to my method, as I first pulled symbolic frames, drawing on the themes raised 
in the literature review, such as penal populism and evidence-based policymaking. 
During the analysis of the descriptive notes, I utilized Manning’s method by comparing 
the symbolic frames in the literature, to those found in the content, focusing on the most 
dominant frames.  
When identifying or coding frames, I also drew on the insights of Saldaña (2009) 
and Owen (2014). Saldaña recommends many coding methods, including descriptive 
coding. Descriptive coding is a process by which themes, concepts and frames can be 
identified.  Owen utilized Saldaña’s method of descriptive coding to identify frames in 
higher education policy documents (2014). Saldaña and Owen contend that descriptive 
coding can provide “essential ground work” and a foundation for deeper analysis (Owen, 
2014:15). That is, it has the advantage of being able to root out the general and larger 
frames of a text (Owen, 2014). In policy analysis, the researcher often does not have a 
definite understanding of what frames may appear in the policy, until after the first stage 
of coding.  Even though the literature review had identified several important themes, I 
utilized descriptive coding to allow new frames and themes to emerge. This method also 
facilitated navigation of the complex legal terminology and political rhetoric of the 
SSCA.  The use of Manning’s (2006) symbolic framing and Saldaña’s (2009) descriptive 
coding allowed for the themes of the debates to be properly identified and increased the 
reliability of my coding structure.  
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In addition to descriptive coding, analytical notes were also utilized at this stage 
for researcher reflexivity.  Analytical memos are reflective documents, allowing for the 
researcher to practise reflexivity in the coding process (Saldaña, 2009). When coding, the 
researcher writes on the process and the reasons for making certain coding decisions. 
These memos are also useful for recording any problems that may be encountered during 
the research process. As coding is a subjective process, this allows for reliability in the 
operationalizing of codes and concepts (Owen, 2014).   Analytical notes also facilitated 
researcher reflexivity.  During this research process, analytical notes were used to record 
my thoughts and opinions. This strategy helped to reveal, and allow me to overcome, any 
latent bias. These notes were made within the first pass of the policy debates and 
recorded within the descriptive notes. Such notes were marked as a researcher’s note and 
colour coded so they would not confuse the coding process. During the coding process, 
when the themes of the descriptive notes were re-evaluated, the analytical notes were also 
re-evaluated and considered when assigning themes. These notes included many different 
aspects, including an opinion about arguments, or notes which may question the validity 
of certain comments or statistics. For example, if I strongly disagreed or agreed with a 
comment made by a member on the bill, this would be noted. Comments which evoked 
an emotional response were also noted. This is evidenced in a small excerpt from the 
notes which were made on Hon. Bob Runciman’s (Conservative) speech during the 
second reading of the Senate: 
“[Runciman comments on] Amendment made by the house Justice committee to 
clause 41: [which includes] Mandatory Minimum for [possessing] 5+ [marijuana] 
plants  
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Me: No reason given? Why is this necessary!?! What is difference to society for 4 
v. 5, 5v. 6 plants, etc...” [emphasis added to the analytical note for clarity] 
As is demonstrated in this example, this allowed any opinions to be expressed in the 
open, so that as a researcher, I was aware of my own biases.  These comments were made 
respectfully, but the notes were made freely and unfiltered. As pointed out by Owen 
(2014) and Saldaña (2009) coding is a sensitive, subjective process. This process is 
complicated by politics, where topics can turn personal and emotionally charged quickly. 
Saldaña quotes Jennifer Mason to justify the use of analytical memos in qualitative 
research: “[Reflexivity] in this sense means thinking critically about what you are doing 
and why, confronting and often challenging your own assumptions, and recognizing the 
extent to which your thoughts, actions and decisions shape how you research and what 
you see” (Saldaña, 2009:33; Mason, 2002:5). Saldaña states that the use of these 
analytical memos allows for critical thinking and for assumptions to be recognized and 
challenged. Additionally, Mason (2002) argues that for researchers to have reflexivity, 
there must be “critical self-scrutiny” and “active reflexivity” throughout the research. To 
be specific, this is achieved by researchers “tak[ing] stock of their actions and their role 
in the research process” (Mason, 2002:7). Mason is also firm in her assertion that 
researchers cannot hope for complete objectivity and neutrality. Instead, “they should 
seek to understand their role in that process” (2002:7). In this spirit, my use of analytical 
memos allowed me to recognize, scrutinize, and challenge my biases throughout the 
research process. By recording such personal reactions and nuances freely in the 
analytical notes, reflexivity and reflection were enhanced, improving the quality of the 
data analysis (Saldaña, 2009; Mason, 2002).  
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3.3.3 Indexing  
 Next was the indexing stage. Indexing is achieved by matching up the symbolic 
frames with specific elements of the text (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). The process is 
systematic: frames were applied to the textual contents of the debates. Where, 
specifically, in the “textual elements” of policy can each symbolic frame be located 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 2002:311)? This was achieved during the pass of the detailed 
descriptive notes. Frames which were identified were re-evaluated. These frames were 
confirmed as being consistent frames within the research. Consistent frames were found 
to be repeated within the House of Commons debates, the Senate debates or both. Even 
frames which may not have been directly related to the topic of the research were still 
recorded, in case they may be relevant in the future. Tags and keywords were added to 
frames and were recorded so they could be returned to at later stages in the research.  
In the coding process, the research questions were revisited. What were the main 
symbolic frames present?  How is evidence regarded or disregarded in the debates? What 
sort of arguments and rationales are presented to justify the SSCA?  Decisions on coding 
were reconsidered to ensure that frames were not looked over or assumed to be 
unimportant. Tags and keywords were again re-visited and adjusted to suit the emerging 
frames.  
 This coding stage involved both inductive and deductive methods. Inductive 
methods were used when re-evaluating themes during coding, which kept the research 
open to all the possibilities for frames which appeared frequently in the debates. 
Deductively, themes which appeared in the literature were also considered during the 
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coding process. However, if themes which were found in the literature did not appear 
after the full pass of the data notes, then such frames were eliminated. This process 
allowed for the most prominent rationales to appear as themes in the data. Additionally, 
such consistent coding re-evaluation ensured that frames were not eliminated due to any 
implicit researcher bias. 
In the indexing stage, the range and frequency of the symbolic frames were 
charted (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002).  This practise is advantageous, as it can give 
intangible elements, such as symbolic frames, a space where they may be easily 
identifiable and visualized (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). All symbolic frames were 
recorded in the chart by the frequency in which they occur. Depending on the exact 
number of times a theme was discussed in the debate, the frames were organized by 
frequency, or how many times each theme appeared. Frames were counted using key-
words and phrases that were assigned and re-assigned throughout the indexing process.  
As the frames were organized by volume, charting allowed for the most salient symbolic 
frames to become apparent. Frames were also broken down into two larger categories of 
“Opposing” (arguments which opposed Bill-C10) and “Supporting” (arguments which 
supported Bill C-10). However, some frames were seen on both sides of the debate 
(although ranging widely in frequency) such as “Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts” 
and “Use of Personal Experiences, or Anecdotes”.  It was in this charting stage that many 
similar frames were condensed into larger frames. Frames which were similar were 
grouped to understand the larger debates in the data.  For example, “Use of Personal 
Experiences”, and “Use of Personal Anecdotes” were condensed into one larger category.  
Collapsing smaller frames into larger frames facilitated identification of the most 
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important frames in the data. It is important to note that some frames were collapsed into 
large categories but were still counted separately if a distinction was necessary. For 
example, the frame “Concern for vulnerable/marginalized groups” included the smaller 
frames of “Concern for Aboriginals”, “Concern for Youth”, and “Concern for the 
Mentally Ill”. This category was condensed so it would be possible to set aside a frame 
that would demonstrate all concerns for vulnerable populations in general. By including a 
frame for each group, it was evident what groups generated the most and least concern in 
debates.  
When the themes were first charted, both rationales of opposing (those who 
opposed the bill) and supporting (those who supported the bill) sides were charted 
together. However, due to the nature of the debates, the themes appeared in the data in an 
oppositional manner, with members responding to each other’s arguments with their own 
counter-arguments. It became useful to separate the themes by opposing and supporting 
rationales to best capture the data. 
To count the frequency of themes, tags were used during each pass of the policy 
debates and descriptive notes. Each potential theme was assigned a tag, or a short-form. 
Tags were recorded for reference. To minimize researcher bias, most frames used were 
substantiated previously from the literature, as mandated by Manning (2006). Research 
remained open to other possibilities outside of the established research, however, the 
clear majority of arguments within the debates were discussed in the literature.  
Frequencies were counted using the “Search and Find” tool in Microsoft Word for each 
specific tag. Although tags were used in both the policy debate document and the 
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descriptive notes, the tags used in the descriptive notes were the ones counted for 
frequency. The descriptive notes were created from the policy debates, and the themes in 
the descriptive notes were scrutinized in the coding process. The intention of the 
‘tagging’ process was to identify the prevalence of key themes, and tagging the 
descriptive notes was most useful for this process.   
Another consideration in this research was the issue of when to apply tags to 
themes. Often, the same theme, or essentially the same rationale or subject, came up 
repeatedly, especially in longer speeches. Once a Senator or MP brought up a theme, it 
was tagged. The same tag would not be applied twice in a speech, unless the theme or 
frame was brought up again after the subject had shifted to another matter or another 
theme. A fair consideration with this method is that a Senator or MP may speak at length 
on one theme and that may be missed in the data. However, this was not the case with 
these specific policy debates. The specific subjects of debates shifted often. Due to this, 
counting the tags in this manner most accurately captured the frequency and the attention 
actors gave to specific themes.  
 Themes with a frequency of less than 15 tags were omitted or collapsed into 
larger frames, with a few exceptions. I arrived at the number 15 inductively, after 
counting the reappearing frames during the coding stage. The response to the frame 
Recognizing Concern for Indigenous Communities was the only exception, with 5 
occurrences in the debates on the supporting side of the legislation. This exception was 
included as it was a direct response to a popular frame on the other side of the debate, and 
in the literature.  
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3.3.4 Interpretation 
 The last stage in analysing the data was the interpretation stage. At this stage, the 
methods used here diverged slightly from Ritchie and Spencer’s recommendations.   According to 
Ritchie and Spencer (2002), these methods are meant to be flexible and to meet the individual 
needs of each researcher. It is in this stage that the theoretical framework was applied to the 
symbolic frames. I also revisited the research question and re-examined the data to identify the 
principle rationales provided by state actors when supporting or opposing the SSCA, and 
especially to identify the presence and significance of evidence, penal populism, values and 
interests in these rationales. The main research question was answered using the frame chart 
created in the charting process. The most salient themes were previously chosen during this 
process, so this question was easily addressed relying on the chart. The themes that emerged from 
the literature review, were found to be relevant in the frame chart and were among the most 
frequent frames identified. Analysis proceeded with a focus on the frequency and content of the 
rhetoric on either side of debates, with particular attention to the role of evidence, experts, penal 
populism, and rationales including voter appeasement and values, and concern for marginalized 
populations. Tags were returned to again, as were the analytic notes, and the descriptive notes, 
and the original document to understand the full context of these themes within the SSCA.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology used in this thesis. A retrospective 
content analysis was used to discern the main symbolic frames within the SSCA. More 
specifically, contextual policy analysis, as outlined by Ritchie and Spencer (2002) was 
used as the main methodological technique, supplemented by the descriptive coding 
47 
 
methods of Saldaña (2009) and the symbolic framing method of Manning (2006). The 
next chapter presents the results of this analysis.  
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Chapter 4 
4.0 Results 
 
This chapter presents the results from the analysis, to answer the main research 
question “What rationales did state actors provide, and what symbolic frames did they 
draw on, in legislative debates on the SSCA?”. The most-common rationales identified 
have been broken into two sections -- supporting and opposing frames – to capture the 
rationales and arguments advanced on each side.  On the supporting side, the 
Conservative party of Canada advocated for the SSCA. On the opposing side, the Liberal 
Party of Canada, the New Democratic Party of Canada, the Green Party of Canada, and 
the Bloc de Quebecois objected to the SSCA.1 Table 4.1 provides a summary of the 
frames and the number of times they appear in debates.   
Overall, this research finds that rationales provided by legislators who debated the 
SSCA reflected broader understandings of crime, values and attitudes concerning justice 
and the role of the state.  The rationales provided by those who supported and those who 
opposed the bill differed somewhat.  Importantly, the supporters held an individualistic 
view of crime, in which offenders needed to be held accountable.  In contrast, members 
of the opposition embraced a more societal view of crime.  Nonetheless, sometimes there 
was overlap in the kinds of rationales adopted by legislators on both sides.  
  
                                                     
1 There was one Conservative senator, Hon. Pierre Claude Nolin, who opposed the bill.  His opposition to 
the bill was similar to other opposers: he held that there was a lack of evidence to support the bill’s 
effectiveness.  
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4.1 Tables: Most Frequent Supporting and Opposing Frames 
Table 4.1.1: Most Frequent Supporting Frames 
Most Frequent Supporting Frames  
Frame Actual Occurrences (on this side) 
1. Victim Advocacy 76 
2. Safe Streets in Canada 74 
3. Harmful Drug Production and 
Dealing 
51 
4. Protecting Society from Dangerous 
Youth 
45 
5. Offender Responsibility, 
Punishment and State Paternalism 
43 
6. Personal Narrative 40 
7. Bill has been debated at length 29 
8.  Use of Scientific Evidence or 
Experts 
26 
9. Concern for Indigenous 
Communities 
5 
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Table 4.1. 2 
Table 4.1.2: Most Frequent Opposing Frames  
 
  
Most Frequent Opposing Frames 
Frame Actual Occurrences (on this side)  
1. Use of Scientific Evidence and 
Experts 
166 
2. Advocacy for Marginalized 
Populations 
103 
 
3. Punitive Penal Populist Rhetoric 96 
4. Hidden Cost of Bill C-10 81 
5. Canadian Exceptionalism 62 
6. Prevention, Rehabilitation and State 
Responsibility  
57 
 
7. Personal Narrative 46 
8. Not enough time to Debate Bill  35 
9. Removes judge discretion  18 
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4.2 Findings – Supporting Frames  
The most popular frames utilized by members of the Conservative party in 
supporting the bill included Victim Advocacy, Safer Streets in Canada, Harmful Drug 
Production and Dealing, Protecting Society from Dangerous Youth, and Offender 
Responsibility, Punishment, and State Paternalism.  
4.2.1 Victim advocacy 
On the supporting side, the most frequent frame was Victim Advocacy.  
Throughout the debates, Conservatives labelled themselves the “party for victims”.   
They argued that the bill would protect victims, and that victims supported the 
legislation. The bill’s detractors were said to be “against” victims. For instance, Justice 
Minister Hon. Rob Nicholson responded to criticism that he had been ‘silent’ on the bill’s 
cost as follows: 
 Speaker, let me tell members who has been silent. It is the NDP on the cost to 
victims in this country. We never hear a question about that coming from the 
NDP and, to be fair, the Liberals as well. They are in on that.  The Department of 
Justice estimated the cost of crime in this country is about $99 billion, of which 
83 percent is borne by victims. If the hon. member is worried about the costs, he 
should start standing up for victims, just to make a change for the NDP (Hon. Rob 
Nicholson, Conservative Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
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Nicholson’s figure concerning the enormous cost of crime endured by victims was a 
statistic frequently utilized by the supporters in this frame.2  
 MP Eve Adams (Conservative) also draws on this frame:  
I think the fundamental issue here is that we are just expressing far too much 
sympathy for the criminals when in fact most Canadians would want us to express 
our sympathy for the victims. That is what this bill does (MP Eve Adams, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
As demonstrated here, Victim Advocacy was used by supporters to cast Conservatives as 
‘good’ people defending the unfortunate and deserving. In contrast, opponents were said 
to be on the side of ‘bad’ people who were undeserving.  Such rhetoric presents a rather 
simplistic or ‘common-sense’ view of crime. There are ‘bad guys’ (criminals) who need 
punishment and ‘good guys’ (victims) who deserve protection and justice.  
This frame contains elements of penal populism, which taps into the anger 
surrounding the perception that the criminal justice system advocates for the rights of 
offenders over victims (Pratt, 2007; Simon, 2007; Garland, 2001).  This is also consistent 
with the research of Simon (2007) and Garland (2001) who argue that penal populist 
governance is victim-focused. 
                                                     
2 This statistic was taken from a 2008 study by the Department of Justice, as indicated by Nicholson. The 
study found that in 2008, the estimated indirect costs of crime in Canada was $99 billion. The cost of direct 
crime was $14.8 billion. According to the study, the 83% of these costs were endured by victims (Zhang, 
2008).   
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4.2.2 Safer streets in Canada 
The second most utilized frame by supporters of the SSCA was Safer streets in 
Canada. Just as the name The Safe Streets and Communities Act indicates, supporters of 
the bill claimed that it would make Canada and Canadians safer from crime and 
criminals. This frame was often discussed as a “mandate” that Canadians gave the 
Conservative government when they ran for election earlier that year, as the party 
platformed on crime reform. These quotes from MP Brian Jean (Conservative) and MP 
Candice Hoeppner (Conservative) demonstrate this rhetoric:  
As noted by the Minister of Justice in his speech to the House last week, this bill 
reflects the strong mandate that Canadians have given us to protect society and 
ultimately hold criminals responsible for their actions (MP Brian Jean, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
On May 2, Canadians gave us a strong mandate to continue working to build our 
economy and to focus on keeping our communities safe. We have listened to them 
and acted on our pledge by introducing this legislation (MP Candice Hoeppner, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
Supporters insisted that by passing the bill, Canadian neighbourhoods would be made 
much safer. However, there was little to no evidence ever presented on how specifically 
the bill would work to reduce crime, other than by putting ‘criminals’ in prison.  
This frame too reflects penal populism. Conservatives argue the policy should be 
passed because the populous has demanded safer communities (see Roberts et al. 2003).   
54 
 
4.2.3 Harmful Drug Production and Dealing 
The third most common frame was Harmful Drug Production and Dealing. This 
frame was used most often to justify the amendments to the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. Within this frame all drug dealing, and drug production are framed as 
serious and harmful to the community. Drug production (such as marijuana grow-
operations) is harmful to society because it destroys property, and chemicals used in 
production can endanger those living near drug labs. Supporters also claim that drug 
dealing is harmful to communities because drug dealers frequently target children: 
The legislation before us today will also provide mandatory minimum penalties 
for serious drug offences when such offences are carried out for organized crime 
purposes or if they involve targeting our children. One case where we repeatedly 
see this is with the targeting of areas around schools by drug dealers. I think all of 
us can agree there are few things worse than specifically targeting our children for 
criminal purposes. Deliberately trying to get kids hooked on drugs for financial 
gain is deplorable, which is why I am pleased to support the measures in Bill C-10 
that provide mandatory minimum sentences for those who engage in this sort of 
illegal activity (MP Ryan Leef, Conservative Party of Canada, House of 
Commons Debates). 
Although no direct evidence is provided for the concern, MP Ryan Leef (Conservative) 
implies that there is a frequent and serious problem in communities of drug dealers 
targeting children. He claims the SSCA will solve this problem through mandatory 
minimum sentencing. In this frame, drug dealing is seen not only as harmful to the 
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community, but more specifically, as ruthlessly victimizing the community’s most 
innocent.  
This frame was often used as a rebuttal to the opposing frame Punitive Penal 
Populist Rhetoric, where opposers claim that the bill is too punitive and only a political 
tactic to gain votes. The supporters rebuke those claims by stating that drug production 
and drug dealing are serious, and therefore warrant punitive measures. For instance, 
Parliamentary Secretary, Hon. Kerry-Lynne Findlay defended the bill:  
These are strong measures, but they are reasonable, and they are meaningful, and 
a meaningful response to a problem that is increasing in and plaguing our cities. 
…. As parliamentarians, we are this country's lawmakers. It is incumbent upon us 
to see that our laws provide appropriate and adequate measures to address this 
very serious problem.  Some members of the House may be of the view that 
serious drug offences do not require a response such as the one contained in the 
bill. However, serious drug crime is a growing problem in Canadian cities and in 
smaller towns, and a serious legislative response is required. The government has 
made tackling crime a priority in order to make our streets and our communities 
safer. This bill is a reasonable, balanced and narrowly structured approach which 
the government is taking toward realizing this goal (Hon. Kerry-Lynne Findlay, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
As demonstrated by Findlay, in this frame, drug-dealing is portrayed as a 
“growing problem” in Canada’s communities, and hence “serious legislative response” is 
required. As with Leef, there is no evidence provided which demonstrates such a problem 
emerging. Others within this frame did offer evidence, at times, that drug production was 
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a serious problem. This was seen specifically with statistics on the growing number of 
marijuana grow-operations on Canada’s West Coast. However, outside of these statistics, 
supporters did not offer much in the way of real evidence that drug dealing harms had 
suddenly escalated, or that drug dealers were regularly targeting children in Canadian 
communities. Personal anecdotes or experiences (under the Personal Narrative frame) of 
increasing drug crimes in communities were also used in place of evidence to argue the 
existence of such problems. 
The Harmful Drug Production and Dealing frame is also consistent with penal 
populism, as it appeals to anger over the failure of the existing system to provide 
adequate punishments for crime.  The supporters claim their laws will protect the law-
abiding, by punishing those who push drugs on innocent victims.  
4.2.4 Protecting Society from Dangerous Youth 
The fourth most common frame was Protecting Society from Dangerous Youth. 
Supporters utilized this frame to justify the changes made to the YCJA, which the 
opposition argued would be harmful to youth populations. In this frame, the supporting 
side argued that the SSCA will “better protect Canadians against violent young 
offenders” (Robert Goguen, CPC). One way in which the act was said to protect the 
public, was by holding dangerous youth accountable for their crimes:  
 The proposed changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act reflect what we as 
parliamentarians have been hearing from our constituents. They are concerned 
about the threat posed by violent young offenders as well as by youth who may 
commit non-violent offences but who appear to be spiralling out of control 
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towards more and more dangerous and harmful behaviour. In talking to fellow 
Canadians, we have found that they can lose faith in the youth criminal justice 
system when sentences given to violent and repeat young offenders do not make 
these youth accountable for their actions (MP Brent Rathgeber, Conservative 
Party of Canada, House of Commons Debates). 
These claims that Canadians need protecting from dangerous youth made by Rathgeber 
and other supporters were often justified with the Personal Narrative frame wherein 
supporters drew on their personal experiences speaking with voters, and as parents 
themselves. As with the other frames discussed so far, this frame reflects individualistic 
and ‘common sense’ approaches to crime and justice. Under this rhetoric, the act will 
keep ‘bad’ kids from harming ‘good’ people. The fear of violent youth expressed in this 
frame may be representative of a moral panic surrounding youth as out of control and 
dangerous (Silcox, 2016; Schissel, 2008).   
This frame also reflects paternalism.  Supporters claimed that the youth needed 
more punishment to protect Canadians, other youth, and society in general (Le Grand 
New, 2015; Beauchesne, 2000; Dworkin, 1976; Feinberg, 1971: 105). Penal populism is 
also evident as Rathgeber and others argue the population -- his constituents and “fellow 
Canadians” – are frustrated with the current system, which has failed to protect them 
from youth who are “spiralling out of control”. This frame claims that the SSCA will 
protect the law-abiding Canadians from violent youth, and that it will correct a long 
history of laws which ignore the rights and needs of fellow Canadians.  
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4.2.5 Offender Responsibility, Punishment and State Paternalism  
The fifth most common frame was Offender Responsibility, Punishment and State 
Paternalism. This frame was often used when rebutting the argument that Bill C-10 
would deny offenders opportunities for rehabilitation, thereby increasing recidivism rates. 
In this frame, supporters of the bill claim that criminals need to be taught a lesson and to 
be responsible for their own rehabilitation and recovery. Supporters argued that offenders 
would be deterred from committing crime to avoid harsh punishments. Additionally, this 
frame also included claims that the state provides the proper rehabilitative tools in prison, 
and it was up to the individual to best utilize these tools:  
[…] Bill C-10 contains amendments that will ensure that rehabilitation, as well as 
reintegration into the community, is a shared responsibility between offenders and 
Correctional Service Canada. The question is, what does this mean practically? It 
means that offenders will be required to conduct themselves in a manner that is 
respectful of other people and their property. It means that offenders must obey 
the rules set out by the institution where they are serving their sentence, as well as 
heed all conditions that govern release. Above all, it means restoring common 
sense. Offenders will simply not receive benefits for bad behaviour. Offenders 
will also be responsible to actively participate in their correctional plan…. We 
firmly believe that with appropriate programs and active participation from both 
the offender and the corrections system that many individuals can become law-
abiding citizens. The successful rehabilitation and reintegration of an offender 
into a community is a shared responsibility. We are committed to providing 
appropriate programs to offenders, but it is only fair to expect offenders to do 
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their part (Parliamentary Secretary Eve Adams Conservative Party of Canada, 
House of Commons Debates).   
As demonstrated by this quote by Eve Adams, under this frame, the offender is 
responsible if they fail to be rehabilitated after the state provided the opportunity to 
reform.  The bill is described as “restoring common sense” to methods of rehabilitation 
by punishing the “bad behaviour of criminals”. Similar to the Victim Advocacy frame, 
this frame hinged on an individualistic view of crime, in which the cause and solution to 
crime is to punish and fix criminals.   
Supporters often cast punishment as a path to rehabilitation.  These comments by 
Hon. Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu (Conservative) and Hon. Christian Paradis (Conservative) 
provide an excellent example of this rhetoric:  
Punishing someone is not a sin. Punishment is not the opposite of rehabilitation; 
the two are complementary. The person who commits a crime must reflect upon 
it. The criminal is isolated and given a sentence: think about what you did to the 
victims, the damage that was caused, and start thinking about how you can 
rehabilitate yourself. We will provide you with the tools to do it (Hon. Pierre-
Hugues Boisvenu; Conservative Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
 We know that opponents of this bill, in Quebec especially, will always pit 
rehabilitation against deterrence, but these are not exclusive of one another—they 
are complementary (Hon. Christian Paradis, Conservative Party of Canada, Senate 
Debates). 
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Paternalism is also evident in this frame, as offenders were sometimes compared to 
children who needed to be taught a lesson.  Consider these comments from the Hon. 
David Tkachuk (Conservative):  
 Logic will tell you, however, that rational individuals think about their own 
consequences. Everyone here who has kids will at one time in their lives have told 
them to think about the consequences of their actions. It is wise advice and those 
who ignore it do so at their peril. Those who commit serious and violent offences 
do so not only at their peril but at the peril of their victims. That is why the 
consequences are so severe and that is why they should be so severe. I firmly 
believe that the end result will be that there will be less crime and fewer people 
going to jail (Hon. David Tkachuk, Conservative Party of Canada, Senate 
Debates). 
Here, Hon. David Tkachuk (Conservative) utilizes the Offender Responsibility, 
Punishment and State Paternalism frame to claim that offenders must be held 
responsible, and harsh punishments will lead to the deterrence of crime. Tkachuk claims 
punishing offenders is akin to parenting.  Offenders, like children, should take time out to 
“think” about their actions. Such a response is just ‘common sense’.  
This frame was often used with the Personal Narrative frame. Tkachuk states that 
he “firmly believes” that these punitive measures will deter crime and lower crime rates. 
However, this belief is not premised on evidence or any substantial proof, other than the 
“common sense” and “logic” that this sort of punishment will be effective. Bosivenu and 
Paradis also give no evidence for their claims that punishment and rehabilitation are 
complementary processes, or that this combination of practises are effective at all. 
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Additionally, the Victim Advocacy frame was also utilized in conjunction with this frame, 
as supporters rationalized that to protect and avenge victims, the penal system had to hold 
criminals accountable. Such beliefs about punishment and recovery reflect the 
individualistic view of crime and punishment. If ‘bad’ individuals could only cooperate 
with the state and learn to stop committing crime, crime would no longer be a problem.  
4.2.6 Personal Narrative  
The sixth most common frame was that of a Personal Narrative. This frame was 
also common among the opposing side. Both sides of the debate utilized the frame in 
similar frequencies, with the opposing side utilizing it 40 times, and the supporting side 
46 times.  In this frame, personal opinions, emotions, experiences and anecdotes were 
used as justifications for the bill. This frame was often used with other arguments to 
support other frames. Most commonly this frame was utilized by referring to past 
professional experience, such as being a police officer, a lawyer, or even from more 
personal anecdotes such as conversations with voters, victims, police officers, or 
experience as a parent. Hon. Bob Runciman’s (Conservative) comments on mandatory 
minimum sentencing give a good example of this frame:  
We believe that certain conduct deserves a consistent approach to punishment. As 
a personal note, I hear about this regularly because I have the good fortune of 
hearing the views of rank-and-file police officers on a regular basis. Three 
members of my family — two daughters and a son-in-law — are front-line police 
officers (Hon. Bob Runciman, Conservative Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
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MP Bernard Trottier (Conservative) cites his experience as a parent as justification for 
supporting tougher drug laws:  
As a father of young children, I welcome these changes to protect the youngest 
and most vulnerable members of our society. Bill C-10 would bring forward 
changes that create tougher sentences for individuals found guilty of the 
production and possession of illicit drugs for the purposes of trafficking. It would 
strengthen the laws that deal with young offenders, making sure they are held 
accountable for their actions and that their sentences fit the crimes that they have 
committed (MP Bernard Trottier, Conservative Party of Canada, House of 
Commons Debates). 
In both these quotes, it is evident how these personal narratives are shaped by the values 
of the supporters. For example, MP Bernard Trottier refers to his beliefs in offender 
accountability, tougher sentences for drug crimes and ‘stronger’ laws for youth offenders 
and backs these beliefs with wanting to protect his son “as a parent”. Hon. Bob Runciman 
(Conservative) also ties his personal experience as the father and family member of 
police officers to the belief that mandatory minimum sentencing provides consistency.  
These quotes also demonstrate how this frame is used to substantiate other frames.  
Bernard Trottier advocates for the Offender Responsibility, Punishment and State 
Paternalism frame when he advocates for more punitive laws. The Victim Advocacy 
Frame is also utilized here as Trottier and Runciman both align themselves as protectors 
of victims and potential victims (children and those who are vulnerable) and police 
officers.  
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This frame was powerfully used in the Senate debates, by the Hon. Pierre-Hugues 
Boisvenu (Conservative) who spoke about his daughter’s murder:   
Honourable senators, as you know, I have been advocating for victims of crime in 
Quebec and in many Canadian provinces for eight or nine years now. I will not 
repeat the story of my daughter, who was murdered by a repeat offender. In 1999, 
that man raped a woman over the course of 12 hours. For his crime, he received 
two sentences: 18 months for rape and another 18 months for forcible 
confinement. The judge thought that since it was the same victim, the same 
criminal and the same circumstances, the two 18-month sentences could be served 
at the same time. Therefore, he was incarcerated in a provincial prison. If his 
sentence had been longer or if he had served it in a federal prison, he would have 
had a right to services. But he was incarcerated in a provincial prison for 18 
months, instead of 36 months, and he was released after serving one-sixth of his 
sentence: after three months. What message was sent to this offender? The 
message was that raping and assaulting a woman is not important. For the past 
month, I have been speaking to a number of media outlets in Quebec, where I 
have often been the target of personal attacks. Because victims do not have the 
right to speak. Silence is the victim's prison. But when I created the [Murdered or 
Missing Persons' Families' Association] association in 2005-06, I wanted to 
empower victims and enable them to speak out... We must therefore inform 
Quebecers and Canadians about the content of this bill. Interestingly enough, once 
people are familiar with the bill's content, they are in favour of it (Hon. Pierre 
Boisvenu, Conservative Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
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This speech represents how the Personal Narrative frame was based on emotion, as well 
as values.  Boisvenu brings up his daughter’s murder again later in the debates, when 
challenging Hon. Andy Mitchell (Liberal) on his anecdotal story of knowing a 17-year 
old offender who was rehabilitated by the Canadian justice system:  
Honourable senators, Hon. Mitchell spoke about the rather touching case of a 17-
year-old girl who was rehabilitated with the help of a program. If we take a minor 
case and generalize, it gives the impression that Bill C-10 will increase the 
number of young Canadians in prison. Even though I do not like to talk about it, I 
would like to talk about the other side of the story. My daughter was murdered by 
a repeat offender who had attacked a woman in 1997 and who had to serve two 
months in the community…. If this man had received a sentence longer than three 
months for raping a woman and if he had had the services of a federal prison 
instead of a Quebec prison, do you think that we could have rehabilitated this man 
and that my daughter would still be alive today (Hon. Boisvenu, Conservative 
Party of Canada, Senate Debates)? 
For Boisvenu, it is the deeply personal and tragic story of his daughter which motivated 
his support for the bill. For others, it was sad stories from voters. Anecdotes were used to 
provide ‘evidence’ about the merits (or flaws) of the legislation.  Ironically, Boisvenu 
accuses Mitchell of generalizing from only one case to demonstrate that rehabilitative 
measures are effective. Yet, Boisvenu justified the need for longer sentences on his own 
personal experience of his daughter’s murder.  
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4.2.7 Bill has Been Debated at Length  
The frame Bill has been Debated at Length was often used in response to 
oppositional frame Bill has been Debated Enough. Supporters rejected these claims and 
said that the SSCA has been debated enough in the Senate and House of Commons. In 
the House of Commons, MP David Wilks (Conservative) makes this point in no uncertain 
terms:  
 Speaker, as I said at the beginning of my speech, this legislation has already 
spent 79 full hours of debate in this place, not including today. It has been studied 
at committee for 123 hours for a total of 8 days. I believe that we have studied the 
bill long enough (MP David Wilks, Conservative Party of Canada, House of 
Common Debates). 
In this frame, supporters also argued that the components of the bill had been introduced 
into parliament before, under different bills which were rejected by the opposition. 
Supporters claim that any attempts to extend debate made by the opposition were just a 
political tactic to stall or block a bill that Canadians had demanded:  
 The principles in the bill should not be a surprise to anyone in this chamber. As 
stated earlier this week, seven of the nine parts of this bill have been discussed in-
depth in either the other place or the Senate over the past five years. It has been 
said by some that the bill is being rushed through Parliament. Honourable 
senators, I would submit that this allegation does not bear up to scrutiny. There 
have been three elections fought on these issues, and there have been countless 
hours of parliamentary debate for the past five years on the merits of most parts of 
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this bill. I want to point out that Canadians are not buying the allegations that the 
bill is being rushed through Parliament. No, Canadians are asking why it is taking 
so long (Hon. Daniel Lang, Conservative Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
When the supporters claim that the bill has been debated enough, they are attempting to 
minimize and shut down debates surrounding the bill. While accusing the opposition of 
stalling the bill for political reasons, supporters used their own political tactic to stifle 
more debates, in order to get the bill passed more quickly. 
4.2.8 Use of Scientific Evidence or Experts 
The eighth most common supporting frame was Use of Scientific Evidence and 
Experts. Legislators selectively drew on evidence to support the claims they made. This 
frame was used by supporters with much less frequency than the opposing side. The most 
widely used statistic by the supporting side was a 2008 study by the Department of 
Justice, which according to supporters found that the enormous cost of crime, ranging 
from $4 billion to 100 billon, was endured by victims This was a specific piece of 
evidence used in rebuttal to claims under the opposing frame Hidden Cost of the SSCA.   
What about the cost of the crime to the victims? There is not a word on that from 
the Liberals. In 2008, it amounted to $14.3 billion, even though the third-party 
costs and costs to relatives and friends or to others who were hurt and threatened 
in the commission of the crime amounted to an estimated $2 billion. Victims, 
their family and friends pay to the tune of $16.4 billion, but you never hear a word 
about that from those on the other side (Hon. David Tkachuk, Conservative Party 
of Canada, Senate Debates).  
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Other quotes from other House Members claim identical statistics, although different 
from the numbers provided by Tkachuk:  
What we do see in the 2008 Department of Justice study is that the victims of 
crime bore 83 percent of the cost of crime in that year in Canada, which was over 
$99 billion. Costs include costs to property, costs to time off work and costs of 
injuries. There are so many costs borne by the victims (Hon. Rob Nicholson, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common Debates).   
In these instances, statistics were used to justify the use of the Victim Advocacy frame. 
However, the evidence frame was also used to support and rationalize the other frames, 
as well.  
The biggest use of evidence by supporters was to refute the evidence provided by 
those who opposed the bill that crime rates were actually decreasing, and hence the bill 
was not necessary. For example, supporters provided statistics on specific crimes in 
specific city centres to justify the need for the bill:  
For example, in 2009, in Winnipeg, the violent stuff, sexual assaults, robbery and 
murder, jumped by 11 percent. That same category of crime in 2008 went up by 
14 percent. That is 25 percent in those two years. It is no wonder that an NDP 
government came to us and asked if we could do something about the legislation 
(Hon. Vic Toews, Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
Supporters also utilized evidence on the “dark figure of crime”. The “dark figure 
of crime” refers to the concept that most crimes go unreported.  Supporters claim the 
“dark figure of crime” was an indication that crime was really on the rise, but that it was 
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unreported. This was often backed up with the Personal Narrative frame, as supporters 
claimed that voters and constituents expressed that they were being victimized more. In a 
good example of this, Hon. Vic Toews (Conservative) responds to an NDP member, who 
asked him why the government felt the need for a punitive bill, in the face of a “20-year 
decline in crime”:  
Speaker, last year, there were 2.1 million reported crimes. Statistics Canada 
indicates that the rate of reported crimes is going down. Reported crimes dropped 
to about 31 percent from about 34 percent.  The point is that many people have 
simply given up trying to deal with the justice system (Hon. Vic Toews, 
Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common Debates).  
A few moments earlier, MP Mike Allen (Conservative) made similar comments on the 
dark figure of crime, and backed this up with numbers from Statistics Canada on certain 
rising crimes:  
 I constantly hear from people in my riding their concerns about crime. There is a 
notion that crime is going down. I think it is going down because people are not 
reporting crime. They do not see the use in doing that. Statistics Canada reports 
increases in pornography, firearms, drug offences, criminal harassment and sexual 
assault (MP Mike Allen, Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common 
Debates). 
Toews and Allen both used statistics to back their statements that crimes go unreported. 
Both speakers give the appearance that their statements are backed by scientific evidence, 
without providing the context for the evidence itself.  Through this frame, supporters not 
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only offered their own interpretation of the data, but also provided statistics to 
substantiate the rejection of opposition evidence that the bill was unnecessary.  
Previous research has argued the Conservatives rejected evidence.  In this frame it 
is clear that they made selective use of evidence to challenge the evidence presented by 
others.  Goodman and Dawe (2017) argued that the Conservative party misused, and even 
created statistics which favoured their arguments.  Without a complete and thorough fact-
check of every piece of evidence, it is difficult to know if any false evidence was 
presented on either side. However, criticism on evidence usage can be made of both sides 
of the aisle: statistics and figures were often used without the full context given.  
Although the Conservatives did not completely ignore evidence, the fact that this 
frame was not as common as others reveals that evidence did not figure particularly 
strongly in their arguments in support of the bill. Moreover, evidence which did not 
support the SSCA was not typically engaged with or rejected as incorrect, but instead was 
not acknowledged in debates; different evidence was presented instead.  
4.2.9 Recognizing Concern for Indigenous Communities 
The final commonly used frame by the supporting side was Recognizing Concern 
for Indigenous Communities. This frame was used in a response to the opposition frame 
Advocacy for Marginalized Populations, in which opposers to the bill claimed that the 
bill would harm marginalized populations such as Aboriginals. At times, the Advocacy 
for Marginalized Populations frame was ignored by the supporting side. When responses 
were made addressing these concerns they were kept rather short. Within this frame, 
supporters of the bill recognized that Aboriginals are disadvantaged in the Canadian 
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justice criminal system, but they argued that this was not particularly germane to the 
legislation. This is demonstrated with MP Kyle Seeback’s response to Jean Crowder’s 
question on what action the government was taking addressing the root causes of crime in 
Aboriginal communities, such as clean water and adequate housing:  
Madam Speaker, my hon. colleague's question was not particularly what I was 
talking about. We are talking about introducing legislation to protect Canadians 
from crime and to support victims of crime. We do have an Aboriginal justice 
strategy in place that we are working on and working very hard to implement.   
However, I want to talk to the people who support this legislation (MP Kyle 
Seeback, Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
A similar exchange took place between MP Sean Casey (Liberal) and MP Dean Allison 
(Conservative):  
MP Sean Casey (Liberal.): What measures are in this bill or otherwise to deal 
with those vulnerable members of our society with respect to their involvement in 
criminal law? 
  MP Dean Allison (Conservative): Speaker, Bill C-10 is about justice. I certainly 
do not disagree with what the member raises. Some of those programs have been 
offered through Indian Affairs. Still more can be done and we will continue to 
work on these issues (House of Common Debates).  
Both these exchanges demonstrate how opposer’s concerns about the impact of the bill 
on Indigenous peoples are deferred. The issues are acknowledged as being important, but 
not relevant to the topic at hand. Supporters claim that the government acknowledges this 
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problem and are taking care of it elsewhere in the government, and with promises of 
“continuing to work” on Aboriginal issues in the country.  
Another defense of the bill within the frame Recognizing Concern for Indigenous 
Communities, claims that the bill will advocate for Aboriginal victims.  Kevin Sorenson 
argued the following:  
We realize that there is a high percentage of aboriginals in our penitentiaries, and, 
yes, that must be addressed as well, but in many cases, there are many aboriginal 
victims who are standing right there while the offender is locked in prison (MP 
Kevin Sorenson, Conservative Party of Canada, House of Common Debates).  
Here, Sorenson suggests that the SSCA will protect Indigenous victims, seemingly from 
Indigenous offenders. This quote demonstrates how other frames were used with the 
Recognizing Concern for Indigenous Communities frame. In the case of this quote, the 
Victim Advocacy frame is also represented here, as Sorenson suggests that even though 
Aboriginals are over-represented, Aboriginal victims should be the real focus of concern.  
Concluding, Recognizing Concern for Indigenous Communities was used to 
respond to opposition member’s concerns that the SSCA would have negative outcomes 
for Indigenous communities. Supporters did not engage with such claims, but rather 
deferred them, saying that they either were not relevant to the discussion of the bill, or 
that they ignored Aboriginal victims  
4.2.10 Summary of Supporting Frames 
To summarize, the frames utilized by the Conservatives which supported the 
SSCA reflected their overarching individualistic view of crime and punishment.  Their 
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simplistic and ‘common sense’ view of crime, held that ‘bad apples’ should be punished 
for hurting victims. Their rationales in support of the bill also reflected penal populism 
and paternalistic values. For them, it was the state’s responsibility to protect victims, by 
holding criminals accountable and ensuring they were adequately punished.  They relied 
on personal experiences and anecdotes, as well as selective evidence that crime was 
increasing, and that victims had to bear the brunt of the costs.   
4.3 Findings- Opposing frames  
When opposing the Safe Streets and Communities Act, members of the opposition 
parties (including the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, the Green Party, and the 
Bloc de Quebecois) drew on many frames including Use of Scientific Evidence and 
Experts, Advocacy for Marginalized Populations, Punitive Populist Rhetoric, Hidden 
Cost of the SSCA, Canadian Exceptionalism, and Prevention, Rehabilitation and State 
Responsibility. Each of these frames reflect the view that crime was a societal and 
systemic issue. 
4.3.1 Use of Scientific Evidence or Experts 
On the opposing side, the most frequent frame was Use of Scientific Evidence or 
Experts. This frame included the use of scientific research and experts to oppose the bill 
and argued that it would be at best ineffective and at worst a disaster, causing an increase 
in the prison population. They drew on a considerable body of evidence which warned 
the bill would be ineffective and harmful (Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Lau and Martin, 
2012; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012; The Northwest 
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Territories Department of Justice, 2012).  Examples of the use of evidence and experts 
can be found in these two quotes:  
I have a letter that has three pages of organizations and individual experts who 
have all studied this legislation, particularly, as it applies to mandatory 
minimums. They all have come to the same conclusion. There is no evidence that 
the legislation is warranted and would actually assist our society overall (MP 
Libby Davies, Liberal Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
All the studies underline time and time again that, if you put people in jail who do 
not need to be there, they will become better criminals. Recidivism will rise, and 
we will have more crime. The studies are so clear, and the science is so clear that 
it is very difficult to know how a government can stand without shame and argue 
that somehow this will be to the benefit of a society (Hon. Lillian Dyck Liberal 
Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
Drawing on expertise and evidence, they argued the bill was not beneficial nor would it 
be effective.  As was mentioned with the supporting frame of the same name, evidence 
and experts were often introduced with a lack of full context and explanation. This was 
common on both sides and might be explained by the lack of time given to each speaker 
to defend or oppose the bill.  
This frame appeared both on its own and in combination with other frames such 
as Concern for marginalized populations and Prevention, Rehabilitation and State 
Responsibility (as will be discussed in the results of these specific frames). 
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Although both supporters and opposers used this frame, they used it differently.  
For opposers, evidence was used to support the perspective that crime is a structural and 
systemic problem.  Evidence was used to provide support for their values and view of the 
world. The frequency with which evidence and experts are used by opposers is indicative 
of how opposition members value evidence and experts in policymaking. It contrasts to 
the supporters’ preference for ‘common-sense’ and ‘logical’ arguments.   
4.3.2 Advocacy for Marginalized Populations 
The second most dominant frame on the opposing side was Advocacy for 
Marginalized Populations. This frame was anticipated in literature which described 
opposition to the potential harm that the SSCA may do to communities (Newell, 2013; 
Marshall, 2015; Lau and Martin, 2012; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and 
Latimer, 2012; The Northwest Territories Department of Justice, 2012). This frame 
includes three sub-frames respecting marginalized groups: youth, Indigenous peoples, 
and the mentally ill. Most concern was expressed about youth. This is logical within the 
specific context of the SSCA, as the omnibus bill included a controversial bill which 
pertained only to the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). Before the SSCA, the goal of 
the YCJA was the protection and welfare of the youth offender. Under the new bill, 
however, the goal of the YCJA was re-classified to the protection of society. The bill 
included measures which would lessen the requirements to keep youth offenders in 
criminal custody. Additionally, under the bill, publication bans surrounding youth 
offenders could be lifted if a trial judge felt it would ‘protect the public’.  The opposition 
raised serious concerns about these punitive sentences and treatments under the SSCA, 
and how such treatments may harm youth offenders. The harm that might come to youth 
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under this bill was accompanied by the Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts frame, 
including data on effective rehabilitation-based programs for young offenders among 
jurisdictions in Quebec, the rest of Canada, and world-wide:  
Speaker, rehabilitation is fundamental. I would like the House to know that the 
Canadian Paediatric Society has also expressed disapproval for the bill. The 
society reports that changing the youth crime law to allow stiffer sentences for 
children as young as 14 will have significant negative consequences. The society 
says the current Youth Criminal Justice Act supports rehabilitation and 
reintegration instead of putting the emphasis on incarceration, and it recommends 
that the federal government work with the provincial and territorial governments 
on youth crime prevention strategies that would include early detection and 
treatment of behavioural and mental health issues that might lead to criminal 
activity.  I will take the example of Texas. In just two years, the focus has been on 
more education and therapeutic programs and on transitioning back to their home 
communities so that there is a greater chance for successful re-entry. The result is 
that youth incarceration rates have been halved in a number of years (MP Kirsty 
Duncan, Liberal Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
For the opposition, the best methods for reducing crime concerned societal changes and 
preventive measures. This meant addressing the systemic issues in marginalized 
communities created from structural inequalities. This focus on the role of 
marginalization reflects opposers values, including concern for the marginalized and a 
commitment to reducing structural inequalities.  
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Opposition members also expressed concern over Indigenous communities. 
However, considering the wealth of data devoted to the potential harms of the SSCA to 
Indigenous peoples, this was less prominent in the debates than expected. Often, the topic 
was brought up by the opposing side, but only mentioned briefly. However, like with the 
other two sub-frames, the concern over the harm the SSCA may do to Aboriginal 
communities was backed up with scientific evidence and advice from experts. Evidence 
on the over-incarceration of Indigenous peoples was mentioned most often. One example 
can be found in the House of Commons Speech from MP Sean Casey (Liberal). Early in 
his speech, Casey briefly mentioned Aboriginal populations, calling the bill, “an act to fill 
prisons in order to build new ones; an act to take more aboriginals off reserves and put 
them into prisons”. He quickly moved on from the topic onto the effects on the mentally 
ill, and the punitive nature of the SSCA. Then, later in his speech, he again circled back 
to the issue of Aboriginals briefly:  
According to the 2006 census, 3.1 percent of our adult population identified 
themselves as aboriginal yet in the same year aboriginal adults accounted for 18 
percent of our prison population in provincial and territorial institutions and 19 
percent in federal institutions. The bill would do a lot of bad things for Canada, 
not the least of which is an increase in aboriginal Canadians in our prisons.  How 
can a government, in any way, be taken seriously when one of the likely results is 
that the bill would lock up even more aboriginal Canadians? That is a national 
disgrace (MP Sean Casey, Liberal Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
Generally, opposition members mentioned aboriginal Canadians only in passing. 
However, some Senators and MPs on the opposition did take the time to address the issue 
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more thoroughly, such as Hon. Lillian Eva Dyck (Liberal), who focused her entire 
allotted time in the Senate to the impacts the bill may have on Aboriginals, including how 
the bill would infringe on the supreme court ruling of R v. Gladue.  Generally, members 
of the opposition argued that it is the responsibility of the Canadian government to deal 
with societal issues, not make them worse through incarceration.  
 The next marginalized group highlighted were the mentally ill. Here too, the 
impacts of the bill were discussed, but not in great detail. Speeches focused on how 
structural factors, such as a lack of services for the mentally ill, have led to the over-
representation of the mentally ill in prison. Scientific data and literature were often used 
to show the harm this bill would do to the mentally ill, but also the broken system which 
leaves mentally-ill people to be dealt with by the judicial system. Evidence was provided 
to illustrate that there are incredibly high rates of mental illness among the incarcerated in 
Canada. Often, as with the youth concerns, examples of other communities which had 
successfully dealt with mentally-ill offenders through rehabilitation programs were 
highlighted as examples of alternatives to the SSCA: 
Overall, the marginalized populations frame, and especially the focus on youth 
within this frame, was used to refute and respond to the Conservative frame Protecting 
Society from Dangerous Youth. It responded to the moral panic of supporters that youth 
are dangerous and out of control, with assertions that youth offenders need help, not 
punishment.  
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4.3.3 Punitive Penal Populist Rhetoric  
The third most common frame on the opposing side was Punitive Penal Populist 
Rhetoric. This frame was used to critique the penal populism underlying the supporters’ 
rationales. It is neatly captured by MP Frank Valeriote (Liberal):  
Crime is at its lowest rate in nearly 40 years and yet the government is willing to 
turn around nearly two generations of decreasing crime rates out of fear and 
fiction instead of facts, ideology instead of evidence [emphasis added] (MP 
Frank Valeriote, Liberal Party of Canada, House of Common debates).  
MP Sean Casey’s (Liberal) remarks on the bill also reflect this frame:   
I will close by saying that the government pretends to be tough on crime. It 
pretends to care. It is a game for the Conservatives. It is a diversion from the real 
issues that matter to Canadians…. The government likes to use slogans and 
gimmicks. It likes to look tough. Many of us on this side are wondering when the 
Conservatives will get tough on creating jobs, get tough on fighting poverty, get 
tough on fighting climate change, get tough on fighting for health care and get 
tough on helping the most vulnerable.   The only thing the government is tough on 
is the truth and it is Canadians who will suffer as a result (MP Sean Casey, 
Liberal Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
Members using this frame accuse supporters of drawing on emotions such as fear, instead 
of relying on the “facts” and “evidence”.  Scholars have argued that such tactics are 
consistent with penal populism (Pratt, 2007).  Opposers sought to counter the appeal to 
emotions by the use of evidence.               
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4.3.4 Hidden Cost of the SSCA 
The frame Hidden Cost of the SSCA was utilized by opposers to argue that the bill 
had hidden costs that the Conservatives were hiding.  The bill was said to be extremely 
costly to provinces. This was premised on the notion that most of the mandatory 
minimums proposed in the bill were under 2 years, and hence would be served in 
provincial institutions. Concern was also expressed for the Canadian tax payer, who 
would be the ‘real’ bearer of the costs of the bill, according to the opposition. MP Anne 
Minh-Thu Quach (NDP) provides an excellent example of this frame in the House of 
Common debates:  
I find it hard to believe that all the Conservative members agree that the 
government should put the provinces further in debt when they do not have the 
slightest bit of evidence that the proposed measures will actually make our streets 
and communities safer. In fact, by taking just 15 minutes to read the news or the 
press releases issued by experts such as the Canadian Bar Association, we quickly 
learn that minimum sentences do not reduce crime rates; this could save us 
$90,000 a day. Minimum sentencing does not work and costs a fortune. The 
government needs to tell taxpayers the truth by revealing the costs and by 
explaining the basis for its proposals, particularly those related to minimum 
sentencing. The government needs to ask taxpayers directly whether they would 
like it to pass a bill of unknown costs that threatens health and education or 
whether they would rather the government take the time to ensure that their 
money is invested responsibly and adopt measures that would truly make their 
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streets and communities safer. Clearly, Canadians would choose the second 
option (MP Anne Minh-Thu Quach, New Democratic Party of Canada, House of 
Common Debates). 
As in evident in Quach’s speech, this frame was often combined with the Use of 
Scientific Evidence and Experts frame to bolster the argument.   
Some provinces directly objected to the bill, while others expressed concerns that 
their province or territory would not be able to keep up with the financial demands of the 
bill:  
While increases in the prison population will strain infrastructure and services, 
[Bill C-10] will also come at an incredible cost to the provinces and territories, a 
cost that many have indicated they are unable to pay. In my own province of 
Prince Edward Island, we are already seeing increases of up to 30 per cent in the 
number of inmates being admitted to our jails as a result of legislation already 
passed by this government. The numbers are growing faster than our ability to 
accommodate them. In order to just keep up, the province would need to triple its 
corrections budget. During this time of economic difficulty, this is incredibly 
challenging. In addition to Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec, 
Ontario and British Columbia have all spoken out against this bill. Quebec's 
justice minister, Jean-Marc Fournier, has openly said that Quebec simply will not 
pay, while Ontario's Premier Dalton McGuinty has made it clear that if the federal 
government wants to push forward with this legislation it must come up with the 
money (Hon. Elizabeth Hubley, Liberal Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
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With such comments, opposers appeared concerned with more than just budgets, but with 
cuts which would take away from other needed services. Thusly, this frame was used by 
opposition members to argue that Canadian tax-payers needed to be protected from 
wasteful spending, and that public funds could be diverted to more important public 
services and infrastructure. Such arguments again reveal the societal perspective and 
values adopted by opposers.  They were concerned with the social impacts of the 
legislation.  
4.3.5 Canadian Exceptionalism  
In using the frame Canadian Exceptionalism, opposers rejected US-style penal 
populism in favour of the ‘Canadian-way’ of ‘doing justice’. This frame asserted that the 
punitiveness of the SSCA was fundamentally “un-Canadian”. Additionally, this frame 
claims that this punitive approach has failed in the US, and that even US conservatives, 
are rolling back these policies. Although this frame is similar to the frame Punitive Penal 
Populist Rhetoric in that it rejected punitive measures, this frame is distinctly different. 
Within the Punitive Penal Populist Rhetoric frame, Conservatives are accused by 
opposers as supporting the punitive bill only to appeal to voters. The difference with the 
Canadian Exceptionalism frame, is the underlying belief (value) that there is a better, 
Canadian, approach to justice. These arguments are reminiscent of those in the literature 
on penal populism, which argued that Canada had avoided a penal populist turn evident 
in the US (Pratt, 2007; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Roberts et al., 2003). The Canadian 
‘way’ of doing justice, according to the opposers, included fairness and evidence-based 
policy. Hon. Geoff Regan (Liberal.) spoke on the issue, and utilized this frame to assert 
that the SSCA is fundamentally un-Canadian:  
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Is that really the model we want to adopt? Do we really want to build prisons, as 
the Americans have done, without any impact on the crime rate, since the crime 
rate in the United States is much higher than it is in Canada? When we are 
looking to take measures to deal with crime, we have to adopt measures that are 
smart and follow concrete examples of good management in other countries, not 
from countries whose approaches have been proved a failure…The NDP approach 
has always been a balanced approach between rehabilitation, restorative justice 
and addressing the problems in the legal system and the parole system, which 
would help reinforce what deserves to be reinforced. Again, this bill is all over the 
map. Instead of addressing this issue more precisely and effectively, the 
government is taking a scattershot approach and trying to pass something, which 
in some ways will succeed, but in several other very significant ways will 
completely change Canada's philosophy of justice [emphasis added] (MP Guy 
Caron, New Democratic Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
MP Jasbir Sandhu (NDP) in the House of Commons also made a similar speech on how 
the ‘American style’ SSCA would alter the fundamental principles of the ‘Canadian 
style’ of justice:  
 The bills [in Bill C-10] range from broad changes to our corrections system that 
are based on a failed US-style approach, to giving the minister absolute power to 
approve or deny the international transfer of offenders. These changes are 
sweeping and will fundamentally change several aspects of Canada's criminal 
justice system [emphasis added] (MP Jasbir Sandhu, New Democratic Party of 
Canada, House of Common Debates).  
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For the opposers, Canadian justice premised on evidence-based measures for 
rehabilitation is fairer and effective than US-style punitiveness. Herein, opposers express 
support for values such as fairness, justice, and efficiency.  They argue the act 
undermines these Canadian values.  
Opposers also cited American conservatives, most commonly Newt Gingrich, 
who had commented on the SSCA and warned the Canadian government that its punitive 
measures would be ineffective.  This quote reflects such rhetoric:  
 There is a consensus, with the exception of our friends across the way, that the 
approach used in the war on drugs was an abysmal failure. Why? Ask people like 
Newt Gingrich. My goodness, I never thought I would use him for validation, but 
it turns out he is now. God bless him, Newt Gingrich now says not to do what 
they did because it is costly and ineffective. California has privatized its prisons. 
It has more prisoners than it can handle. Judges are forcing the state to release 
prisoners… What are we going to do? It turns out we are going to adopt its failed 
policy (Hon. Tommy Banks, Liberal Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
Not only is this punitive style of justice un-Canadian, but it is now rejected by even the 
most conservative Americans.  
Overall, this frame was based on values and beliefs that Canadians are different 
from (and that our criminal justice system is more effective than) the United States. As 
can be seen with the quotes presented, the frame Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts, 
was also used in conjunction to document the failure of the US system and warn of the 
negative consequences of the bill here in Canada.  
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4.3.6 Prevention, Rehabilitation and State Responsibility 
The frame Prevention, Rehabilitation and State Responsibility reflected principles 
and values concerning crime, and how the state should treat offenders. According to the 
frame, the role of the state should be to prevent crime and promote rehabilitation. Policy 
should tackle the root causes of crime, such as poverty and a lack of social services. 
Moreover, opposers claim that rehabilitation should be a priority.  This frame was at 
times utilized by opposers to combat the supporting frame Offender Responsibility, 
Punishment and State Paternalism. However, this frame was used often on its own or 
combined with other frames, such as Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts.  Evidence 
was marshalled to argue that prevention and rehabilitation were more efficient and 
effective measures in Canada and world-wide. An example of the rhetoric in this frame is 
found in this quote from the House of Commons debates:  
If the purpose of Bill C-10 really is to make our streets and communities safer, 
why does it not include more investment in rehabilitation and prevention 
programs? I know the government does not like statistics, but 80 percent of 
incarcerated women are in prison for crimes related to poverty, including 39 
percent for unpaid fines. These figures released this morning by the National 
Council of Welfare point to a real problem. The council also noted that the cost to 
incarcerate a woman who fails to pay a $150 fine is $1,400.  I am sure the 
Minister of Finance will be pleased to hear—and free of charge too—that for 
every dollar invested in prevention and rehabilitation, the government would save 
far more in incarceration costs, addiction costs and the cost of crimes committed 
in prisons themselves. Front-line workers such as social workers, street outreach 
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workers, school psychologists and counsellors are looking for an opportunity to 
become more involved on the ground to prevent crime by targeting at-risk 
groups—young people in distress, people with mental illness or substance abuse 
problems, and marginalized people. Their work allows would-be offenders to get 
help and referrals to the services they need. All studies and examples from 
elsewhere demonstrate that prevention is more effective than incarceration and 
punishment (MP Anne Minh-Thu Quach, New Democratic Party of Canada, 
House of Common Debates).  
In this specific example, the scientific evidence referred to here is general; however, 
opposers also drew on decades of research supporting policies which focused on 
prevention and rehabilitation. The Personal Narrative frame was also often used to 
justify the need for prevention and rehabilitation.  MPs provided anecdotes concerning 
people they knew who were rehabilitated or helped by these policies.  They also 
expressed personal values and beliefs about what justice should be. The frame of Hidden 
Costs was also used often in conjunction with this frame, as part of the evidence that the 
bill’s funds would be better invested in preventive causes. These additional frames were 
all used to support the values that crime is a social phenomenon, and solutions need to 
address systemic causes.  
Members of the opposition argued that debates surrounding the SSCA reflected a 
fundamental disagreement over values:   
[This] omnibus bill is about principles and priorities. At its core it is about values. 
If we spend billions of dollars on building unnecessary prisons while crime is 
receding and putting more people in prison for longer periods of time, that money 
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cannot be used to invest in: a social justice agenda, child care, health care, crime 
prevention, seniors or social housing. At the end of the day, we would probably 
have more crime and less justice as a result of this (Hon. Irwin Cotler, Liberal 
Party of Canada, House of Common Debates). 
Opposition members advocated that criminal justice is also a social justice issue. Crime 
emerges out of societal conditions, such as the lack of social services and preventative 
crime measures. In contrast, supporters held an individualistic view of society and crime; 
they focused on punishment over prevention.  
4.3.7 Personal Narrative 
The next frame on the opposing side was Personal Narrative. It is important to 
note that on both sides, Personal Narrative was a lower-frequency frame compared to 
other frames that emerged, and that both sides in this debate utilized this frame in very 
similar frequencies. Like the supporting side, this frame was often used in combination 
with other frames, to justify other frames. The opposing side often used this frame 
alongside “Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts”. For example, they would give a 
personal story of how rehabilitation worked, but then would present evidence which 
backed up their story.  
Personal narratives were tied to different values and frames by supporters and 
opposers.  
Throughout my career as a lawyer and now into my career as a legislator and a 
representative of my community, I have reviewed the law as a tool to advance the 
issue of social justice whenever possible. While engaged on the committee against 
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family violence and women in crisis or the Wellington-Guelph Housing Authority 
on great projects like Onward Willow Better Beginnings, Better Futures, or 
changing Guelph's police response to violence between spouses and changing 
court sentencing for offenders by ensuring their enrolment in anger management 
programs, not incarceration, I gained a deeper understanding of the complexities 
surrounding justice issues (MP Frank Valeriote, Liberal Party of Canada, House 
of Common Debates) 
In this speech, Valeriote advocated for the use of such prevention strategies per his 
former experience as a lawyer. It is clear from this quote that the opposing frame of 
Personal Narrative represents values of social justice, rehabilitation and crime 
prevention, all of which can be found in the frame “Prevention, Rehabilitation and State 
Responsibility”.    
4.3.8 Bill has not been Debated Enough 
This frame was utilized by the supporting side to demonstrate a frustration over 
the lack of time given to debate the bill. This frame was often counter-argued with the 
frame from the supporting side Bill Has Been Debated at Length. Supporters argued that 
the opposition was only using this frame as a political tactic, to stall the bill. Opposition 
members countered that the current government did not want to engage in debate on the 
bill and were using their own political tactics to pass a bad bill. Rationales in this frame 
included that the supporting side was violating parliamentary procedure by rushing 
through the bill, and thereby disrupting the rules of Canadian democracy.  Due to the 
large volume of the SSCA itself, which is over a hundred pages long, the opposition 
claimed that they were not given enough time to debate all the sections of the bill:  
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As we have heard, Bill C-10 incorporates nine measures that were being studied 
by Parliament before the spring election. The government combined all these 
elements, which were covered by rather lengthy bills, in a brick of a bill that is 
more than 100 pages in length, its omnibus crime bill, in order to pass these 
measures post-haste. Honourable senators, Canadians expect Parliament to 
carefully study all bills that are introduced. Unfortunately, the government 
seriously impeded the other chamber from doing so. As my colleague, Hon. 
Cowan, said in his speech yesterday, I hope that this chamber will have the time 
required to scrutinize this bill in a responsible manner (Hon. Claudette Tardif, 
Liberal Party of Canada, Senate Debates). 
Additionally, the opposition argued that this went beyond normal procedure, and was 
verging on disrupting Canadian democracy:  
There is a moral, if not ethical, and some would suggest legal obligation, to 
respect the legislature and parliamentary law. There is the need to acknowledge 
that. Just because the Conservative government has the most seats does not mean 
that it is a little dictator. There is an issue of respect in allowing legitimate debate 
on important issues facing Canadians. Just because it has a majority does not 
mean it gets to dictate everything that happens in the country over the next four 
years, in a dictatorship way [emphasis added] (MP Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal 
Party of Canada, House of Common Debates).  
In this manner, members of the opposition argued the Conservatives were undermining 
Canadian parliamentary and democratic process.  Such arguments may reflect values 
such as a commitment to democracy, as well as a formal rational commitment to 
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established procedures. Opposition members positioned themselves as the protector of 
these values.  
   
4.3.9 Removal of Judge Discretion 
The final frame on the opposing side is Removal of Judge Discretion. This frame 
emerges from concern over mandatory minimum sentencing in the SSCA. As with other 
frames, Removal of Judge Discretion represented the opposition’s values and 
understanding of crime as a social problem, resulting from social conditions such as 
poverty or systemic racism. Opposers claim that mandatory minimum sentencing will 
take away the ability of the judge to consider mitigating factors and complex contexts to 
a crime. These factors included poverty, minority status, specifically being Aboriginal, 
and mental health and substance abuse disorders. MP François Lapointe’s (Liberal) quote 
below gives a good exemplar of this frame:  
Another thing related to this bill that does not make sense is the fact that it affects 
the right of judges to simply do their work, exercising their right to judge. This is 
an ideological blunder. It is something that leads us to a sort of limitation on what 
the law should be and deprives judges of their opportunity to think. What will 
happen if we tell a judge that the theft of an apple is punishable by a minimum 
sentence of one day in prison? A judge's job is to determine whether the apple 
was stolen simply as mischief or whether it was stolen to feed a starving child. 
Any judge who does his or her work properly would not impose the same 
sentence in these two cases (MP Francois Lapointe, Liberal Party of Canada, 
House of Common Debates).  
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If judges’ discretion is removed, the social context of crime – which they view as vitally 
important -- cannot be considered.  Opposition members also argued that removal of 
judicial discretion would also disrupt the system of justice in Canada. The leader of the 
opposition, Hon. James S. Cowan (Liberal), expressed these concerns:  
Honourable senators, this is what happens when the legislature usurps the role of 
a judge. It is often said that the criminal law is a blunt instrument. It is made 
significantly blunter when it takes away judicial discretion. Last week, Hon. 
Andreychuk reminded this chamber of what Justice Dickson said: There is in 
Canada a separation of powers amongst the three branches of government — the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Our system of justice is built on a 
careful balancing of the roles divided among Parliament, judges, prosecutors and 
the police. This balance has evolved over centuries. Honourable senators, 
mandatory minimum penalties throw this balance out of whack, and there is 
absolutely no clarity, or even forethought, as to what the new balance will look 
like (Hon. James S. Cowan, Liberal Party of Canada, Senate Debates).  
Underlying this frame are the values of fairness and justice. The removal of judge 
discretion, according to opposers, has the potential to disrupt the careful balance of the 
Canadian justice system.  
4.4 Summary  
To summarize the findings, the frames represented both sides’ values about crime 
and punishment. For the opposers, crime is a systemic and societal issue. Supporters, on 
the other hand, described crime as an individualistic phenomenon in which ‘bad apples’ 
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hurt innocents and need to be taught a lesson. When taking an over-arching view of both 
frames, it is also clear how values on what the role of the government should be in terms 
of the penal system also differ. Opposers are concerned with the state’s responsibility to 
provide rehabilitation within the prison system, and to provide options for corrections 
other than imprisonment, such as drug addiction treatment. The overall goal for the 
government, for opposers, is to reduce recidivism and prevent crime. For supporters, 
punishment and rehabilitation are complementary measures, and the offender is 
responsible for their own recovery while in prison. The offender must pay for hurting 
innocent victims, and the state has a responsibility to keep the offender away, so they can 
no longer harm anyone. Supporters of the bill view the overall goal of the penal system as 
protecting the public from dangerous people through tough sentences. Such values are 
represented in both sides of the debates through the commonly utilized frames.   
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Chapter 5 
5.0 Discussion  
This thesis examined the policy debates surrounding the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act (SSCA) 2012 to discover how drug and criminal policy debates are 
framed, specifically pertaining to the role of penal populism and evidence in 
policymaking. The SSCA was a controversial act and much evidence was marshalled to 
illustrate that the act would negatively impact marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
Regardless, the act passed.  Through a content analysis of legislative debates, this study 
examined support for and against the act, to enhance understanding of the act’s passing, 
and to identify the values and concerns shaping legislative activity.  
The thesis was guided by a general research question: “What rationales did state 
actors provide, and what symbolic frames did they draw on, in legislative debates on the 
SSCA?” The results detailed the main symbolic frames, separating the frames by those 
who supported the bill and those who opposed the bill. 
 Premised on the literature, three supplementary research questions were 
specified: 1) How did members of the Conservative party rationalize the bill, and what 
was the role of evidence and penal populist rhetoric in their rationalizations? 2) In the 
legislative debates, did the arguments for and against the bill reflect legislators’ values, 
and opinions on what makes an ‘efficient’ justice system?  3) How are marginalized 
populations, such as youth and Indigenous populations, regarded in the legislative 
debates?  
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In this final chapter, the results of this thesis are put into the larger sociological 
context of policymaking in Canada. First, this section will include an overview of the 
results to address the general research question: “What rationales did state actors provide, 
and what symbolic frames did they draw on, in legislative debates on the SSCA?”. Next, 
there will be a discussion of how the results relate to the sociological literature. This 
section will also discuss the broader implications of this thesis to policymaking, 
specifically regarding the place of penal populism, evidence, and state actors.  To 
conclude, there will be a discussion on the limitations of this research, as well as possible 
avenues for future research.  
5.1 Overview of Findings  
The results described the most common frames on both the opposing and 
supporting side of the Safe Streets and Communities Act. For the Conservatives, the most 
common frame was Victim Advocacy. In this frame, those who supported the bill argued 
that the bill was finally putting victims before offenders, and that the bill would represent 
victims in the criminal justice process.  Those who opposed the bill, as well as the former 
Liberal government, were cast as being more concerned with the rights of offenders than 
victims. Safer Streets in Canada was the second most common frame. Under this frame, 
supporters insisted that the SSCA’s ‘tough’ laws would keep Canada’s streets and 
communities safe. The third most common frame, Harmful Drug Production and Dealing 
was used by the Conservatives to discuss the dangers of drug production and dealing to 
Canadian communities and law-abiding citizens. The frame Protecting Society from 
Dangerous Youth was utilized to justify the punitive changes to the YCJA. Supporters 
argued that such changes were necessary, to protect the public from violent youth 
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offenders, a concern ignored by previous governments. The fifth most common frame 
used by supporters was Offender Responsibility, Punishment, and State Paternalism. This 
frame was used to argue that the SSCA would hold offenders responsible for their crimes 
and punish them for wrong doing. Under this frame, supporters likened offenders to 
children needing to be ‘taught a lesson’. The next most commonly used frame was 
Personal Narrative. In this frame, personal experiences, anecdotes, emotions and 
opinions were used as justifications for the bill. Next, the frame Bill has been Debated at 
Length was used to argue that there had been more than enough time spent on debating 
the SSCA. Under the 8th most common frame, Use of Scientific Evidence and Experts, the 
supporting side of the debate included evidence and experts in some elements of their 
argument. Evidence was used to claim that the crime rate had not gone down, that crime 
often goes unreported, and that victims are responsible for the enormous cost of crime. 
Lastly, the frame Recognizing Concern for Indigenous Communities was utilized by 
supporters to acknowledge the unequal position of Aboriginals in the criminal justice 
system. Despite supporters having some response to concerns about Indigenous people, 
concerns were most often dismissed as being irrelevant and ‘off-topic’. To summarize, 
the supporting frames contained overarching themes of the party’s individualistic views 
of crime and punishment.  The supporting frames represented a ‘common-sense’ 
understanding of crime, where ‘bad people’ victimize innocent people.  
For opposition members, the most common frame was Use of Scientific Evidence 
and Experts. Evidence and experts were at the forefront of the concerns for the 
opposition, and opposition members presented evidence that the bill would be harmful, 
costly, and ineffective. The second most common frame was Advocacy for Marginalized 
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Populations. Opposers were critical of how the bill would impact marginalized 
populations, mainly youth. The third most common frame was “Punitive Populist 
Rhetoric. Under this frame, opposers argued that the Conservative party was pushing the 
SSCA under a punitive rhetoric which appealed to voters’ fearful and emotional reactions 
to crime. Next was the Hidden Cost of the SSCA. This frame expressed concern with how 
much the bill would cost and accused the Conservatives of trying to hide the true cost of 
the bill. The frame Canadian Exceptionalism was utilized by opposers to argue that the 
punitive nature of the SSCA went against the fundamental principles of ‘Canadian’ 
justice. Next in Prevention, Rehabilitation and State Responsibility, the opposition 
members described the role that they believed the state should play in matters of criminal 
justice. This was premised on a criminal justice strategy which would rely on 
preventative measures such as the reduction of poverty, to address the societal problem of 
crime. Under the Personal Narrative frame, the seventh most utilized frame, opposers 
described their own personal experiences and anecdotes as rationales for rejecting the 
bill. Lastly, the 9th most common frame was Removal of Judge Discretion. This frame 
was utilized to express concern over the bill’s mandatory minimums, which would lead to 
the removal of judicial discretion. Overall, these frames represented values which were 
based on a societal conception of crime, in which states needed to consider the most 
effective preventative and rehabilitative measures.  
In summary, the results reflected the overarching elements of each sides’ values 
concerning crime and punishment. The results revealed that both parties had opposing 
values with respect to crime. For supporters, crime is individualistic and about the ‘bad 
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choices’ of ‘bad people’. On the other hand, opposition members insist that crime is a 
social problem, which requires a societal fix, such as alleviating poverty.  
5.2 Relation to Literature  
5.2.1 Penal populism and the “Punitive Turn” in Canadian 
Criminal Justice Policy   
The first supplementary research question addressed the Conservative Party’s use 
of penal populism and evidence in the legislative debates.  
According to Roberts et al (2003), penal populism is “the pursuit of a set of penal 
policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime rates or promote justice…” (5). In 
pursuing such policies, state actors utilize penal populism to tap into the public’s anger 
towards the justice system (Pratt, 2007; Simon, 2007; Garland, 2001). Therefore, displays 
of penal populism often hinge on claims of demanding justice for victims, via harsh 
penalties for offenders (Pratt, 2007; Simon, 2007; Garland, 2001). Prior to 2006, Canada 
established a history of avoiding such penal populism, which had swept most the United 
States (Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Pratt 2007; Roberts et al., 2003). However, with the 
election of a Conservative minority in 2006, literature points to a punitive turn in 
Canadian criminal justice history. This ‘punitive turn’ is marked by both the escalation of 
penal populism in criminal justice matters, and the rejection of experts and evidence in 
policymaking (Goodman and Dawe, 2017; Kelly and Puddister, 2017; Doob and 
Webster, 2015 & 2016; Azzie, 2015; Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015; Cunningham, 
2014; Winfield, 2013; Hyshka et al., 2012; Jarvis, 2012; Mallea, 2010).  
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As was described in the literature, penal populist rhetoric among the Conservative 
Party is evident throughout the results. Supporters aligned themselves as the “party for 
victims” while opposers were cast as ‘sticking up for criminals’. They claimed to 
represent the anger and frustration among ‘Canadians’ and ‘victims’ who agree that 
former governments have not done enough These findings are consistent with the work of 
Simon (2007), Pratt (2007), and Garland (2001), who argue that penal populism 
manifests with emotional appeals for victims. Moreover, there is evidence that the 
Conservatives sought to “govern through crime” (Simon 2007), as representing victims 
was presented as the “mission” of the Conservative government. Offenders were painted 
as requiring punishment to pay for their crimes against victims and society. Such 
elements of penal populism were evident in every major frame on the supporting side.  
Penal populism is also evident in the displays of state paternalism throughout 
supporting debates. According to O’Malley (1999), state actors who engage in penal 
populism often use state paternalism to justify punitive policies. State paternalism was a 
reoccurring theme in the supporting frames. Supporters spoke of offenders as being like 
children, and likened prison time to sending children to “time-out” in which they needed 
to “think about” their actions.  
Conversely, elements of Canadian exceptionalism were apparent in the opposing 
side of the debates. In the debates, fair and effective “Canadian-style” justice was directly 
opposed to the punitive and ineffective “American-style” justice. This position is 
consistent with literature on Canada’s resistance to penal populism prior to 2006 of the 
‘Canadian way’ (Pratt, 2007; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Roberts et al., 2003).  Many 
legislators advocated for a ‘Canadian’ alternative approach to justice.  If Conservatives 
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represented a penal populist turn, the members of the opposition continued to resist this 
turn.  
Literature surrounding the federal government under Harper also described a 
rejection of experts and evidence in policymaking. However, results differed slightly 
from the literature. The results suggested the Conservatives utilized scientific evidence 
selectively and sparingly, focusing on costs, and relying on value-driven arguments 
instead. The Conservatives did not so much reject the evidence brought to challenge the 
act as alternately declare it irrelevant, draw on their own evidence (selective evidence 
about cost and crime), and shift the focus of debate away from evidence towards 
emotional appeals to support victims and punish offenders.   
Overall, there is ample evidence that members of the Conservative caucus 
embraced penal populism and paternalism in their rationales. While they did not entirely 
reject evidence, they used is sparingly and selectively, generally to support more value-
based arguments.  
5.2.2 Weber: Values and Social Action  
The second supplementary research question was concerned with whether state 
actors’ rationales reflected values and rationality, as neo-Weberians argue.  Recall that, 
for Weber, social action is shaped by different types of rationality (Anter, 2014; Breen; 
2012; Morrison, 2006 Weber, 2007). Formal-rational action is instrumental, calculated on 
obtaining the most efficient means to an end (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber 2007). 
According to Weber, this is the most commonly used type of rationality within the state, 
as it is based in efficiency, control and routine (Breen, 2012: 9; Morrison, 2006; Weber, 
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2007).  Following formal rationality, instrumental-rational action is calculated on 
obtaining the most efficient means to an end (Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Weber 2007).  
A second type is substantive rationality, which is tied to values or a system of values 
(Breen, 2012; Morrison, 2006; Kalberg, 1980; Weber, 2007). Value-rational social action 
follows substantive rationality where social action is guided by “a value for its own sake” 
(Breen, 2012: 10; Morrison, 2006: 359; Weber 2007).  Although efficiency is not 
disregarded in this type of social action, it is a much lower priority than the obtainment of 
the value itself (Breen, 2012; Weber, 2007). Weber identified other types of rationality 
including theoretical rationality, but this type is not directly related to any type of social 
action (Breen, 2012 Morrison, 2006; Weber, 2007), and was not of focus here.    
Formal and substantive rationality were evident in the rationales provided by 
legislators for their actions and decisions. Opposition members, for instance, argued that 
the bill was not the best means to achieve the stated goals (protect victims and improve 
the criminal justice system); rather, they argued evidence suggested that the bill would 
create more problems.  These rationalizations are tied with formal rationality. Opposers 
argued that current formal institutional structures (correctional facilities, judicial 
processes) were effective, and could be strengthened to be more effective.  At the same 
time, opposition members drew on values reflecting the “Canadian way” of meting out 
justice, and concern for the interests of marginalized persons in their opposition to the 
act. Moreover, opposing members’ values reflected a societal and systemic understanding 
of crime. Thus, there is evidence of both formal and substantive rationality in the 
speeches made by legislators opposed to the SSCA.  
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Both formal and substantive forms of rationality are also evident in the 
supporters’ rationales for the bill. The results suggested that support for the bill was 
posited on “tough on crime” and individualistic values, in which the Conservative 
government claimed that the SSCA would represent victims through punitive measures. 
In this way, the supporters are guided by substantive rationality and value-rational social 
action, motivated by an individualistic view of justice. At the same time, supporters were 
concerned with efficiency – especially in terms of cost. Supporters drew on statistical 
evidence to argue victims pay the cost of crime, that crime rates were rising in some 
specific areas, and to demonstrate that crime was going unreported. Yet, despite this 
selective use of evidence, the results suggested that supporters presented evidence only to 
support value-laden rationales of punishment, justice and individual responsibility.  Even 
when utilizing the scientific evidence, the specific way in which supporters used evidence 
best falls under value-rational action, guided by substantive rationality.  
Opposition members relied on formal and substantive rationality, while the 
supporting side relied more on substantive rationality, although they tried to argue that 
pursuing values such as protecting victims would also lead to a more efficient criminal 
justice system. State actors on both sides of the debate blended their own values 
throughout their arguments.   
5.2.3 Marginalized Voices 
The third and final supplementary research question focused on representations of 
the marginalized in the legislative debates on the SSCA. There is a wealth of scientific 
studies and reports which described the potential catastrophic effects of the SSCA on 
marginalized populations (Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Cunningham, 2014; Lau and 
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Martin, 2012; Jarvis, 2012; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012; 
The Northwest Territories Department of Justice, 2012). Specifically, there was concern 
over how the legislation would impact youth, due to the harsh amendments made to the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act under the bill (Cunningham, 2014; Lau and Martin, 2012; The 
John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012). Literature also discussed the 
potential impacts on Indigenous groups, due to the removal of judicial discretion through 
the bill’s implementation of mandatory minimum sentencing (Newell, 2013; Marshall, 
2015; Cunningham, 2014; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and Latimer, 2012; The 
Northwest Territories Department of Justice, 2012; Lau and Martin, 2012). There was 
also concern expressed for those with mental illness, the elderly, women, and virtually 
every social group among the literature (Cunningham, 2014; Lau and Martin, 2012;).  
In the debates, youth were a high priority. Opposition members expressed 
concerns over youth which were identical to the concerns in the literature. Those who 
supported the bill argued that violent youth offenders would endanger Canadians if the 
bill was not passed. However, there was much less concern expressed about Indigenous 
populations. It is worth noting that the focus on youth may be explained by the direct 
relation to youth offenders in the bill, as it amended the YCJA. Even in this context, the 
small consideration that Indigenous groups were given by opposition members seemed 
disproportionate compared to the concern in the literature. Meanwhile, supporters 
dismissed the issue of Indigenous inequalities as being off-topic from the SSCA. There 
were also occasional concerns voiced by opposition members over how those with mental 
illness may receive jail time instead of help under the SSCA.  
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Voices that were prioritized most in the debates were the voices of victims and 
offenders. The voices of victims were represented by the Conservatives, who focused 
most on victim advocacy in their debates. Through their debates, opposition members 
advocated for the fair and just treatment of offenders. Opposition members claimed 
offenders should be treated with the most efficient methods, to prevent offenders from 
creating more victims. In this way, both those who supported the bill and those who 
objected to the bill were representing victims and offenders throughout the debates.  
Literature which described the SSCA as marginalizing certain voices, was 
partially confirmed.  The results proved to be complex. Voices that were prioritized were 
not necessarily those of privilege, but some marginalized voices were still ignored or 
silenced. In particular, Indigenous groups’ concerns were marginalized, and youth were 
demonized by the Conservatives.  However, other marginalized groups received a great 
amount of concern, such as victims and offenders, and youth. Additionally, it is worth 
noting the influence of values over what voices were prioritized. Through their concern 
for offenders and youth, opposers demonstrated their belief that crime was a societal 
issue. For supporters, their punitive stance on youth and dismissiveness of Indigenous 
issues reflected individualistic notions of crime.  
5.2.4 Linking Penal Populism, Evidence, Values, and State actors 
in Policymaking  
This study has found that neo-Weberian views of the state and state actors are 
helpful in understanding legislative debates surrounding the SSCA.  This theoretical 
perspective helps to reveal how penal populist rhetoric, the use of evidence, and the 
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representation of marginalized voices are all inter-connected, reflecting the values and 
interests of state actors. Neo-Weberian theory views the state actor as any other social 
actor: with their own interests and values (Adams and Saks, 2010; Saks, 2010; Zhao, 
2009; Tickamyer, 1981; Weber, 2007). According to these theories, state actors often 
advocate for their own values in policymaking (Saks, 2010; Zhao, 2009; Fraught, 2007). 
Additionally, self-interested state actors often act in line with the “common-sense” values 
of the populous to keep their positions as elected officials (Stevens, 2011; Zhao, 2009; 
Tickamyer, 1981). Therefore, placing this literature in context with the results, the 
implications for state actors and the SSCA are two-fold. First, as we have seen, state 
actors debating the SSCA represented their own values and views of the world. Values 
played out in the framing of punitiveness, evidence, and marginalized populations.  
Secondly, state actors in legislative debates of the SSCA may have adopted ‘common-
sense’ populist rhetoric to appeal to voters. This was demonstrated by the penal populist 
rhetoric of the supporters. Therefore, neo-Weberian theory can explain how state actors 
may have supported or opposed the SSCA based on their own values or in defense of 
their positions as elected officials (Tickamyer; 1981; Adams and Saks, 2018; Stevens, 
2011; Saks 2010; Weber, 2007).  
The role of evidence and experts in the SSCA and in policymaking in general can 
also be further explained through this framework. This study found that the role of 
evidence in debates on the SSCA was less straightforward than suggested by the 
literature.  Conservatives and opposition members utilized evidence to represent their 
own values on crime and punishment.  Therefore, this thesis helps to discern that, at least 
at times, evidence can be used to support value-based rationalizations made by state 
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actors. This supports the work of Cairney (2016), Smith (2013), and Yeo (2012). The 
results of this thesis highlight the need for a more nuanced view of evidence, which 
understands that the use of any evidence can be a value-based decision by a social actor.  
In conclusion, when applying the theoretical framework of Weber and his 
contemporaries, the complex role of state actors in policymaking can be better 
understood, as opposed to the often-one-dimensional understandings of the state as only 
an instrument for the elite. A neo-Weberian framework could be applied to state activity 
in future analyses, to allow for the complexities of state actors’ policymaking to be better 
understood.    
5.3 Limitations and Future Research  
 The thesis investigated the major debates for and against the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. In terms of limitations, this research was limited due to the large 
volume of data within the legislative debates. This thesis examined only the debates of 
this one bill at second reading. A more comprehensive look at legislation, even 
legislation on criminal justice policies, might identify additional and alternate frames. 
The SSCA was significant and highly controversial; however, analysis of one bill cannot 
hope to capture the complexity of a federal government in power for a decade. Therefore, 
this study has limited generalizability.  
 The issue of researcher bias in this study also may be a possible limitation. 
However, steps were taken to avoid the influence of researcher bias. As discussed in the 
methods, the frameworks of Saldaña (2009) and Mason (2002) were used to increase 
reflexivity and lessen researcher bias. In this technique, analytical memos were taken 
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throughout the entire research process. These memos recorded the justifications behind 
coding decisions and researcher thoughts and opinions (Saldaña, 2009). As pointed out 
by Mason (2002), researchers cannot be neutral. Instead, they must work to keep constant 
awareness of their prejudices and how this may impact the research. Through the 
analytical memos, it allowed for there to be a persistent awareness of how my biases may 
impact the outcome of research (Saldaña, 2009; Mason, 2002).  
In terms of Canadian policymaking, future research should focus on the complex 
place of evidence in policy. As the Harper government moves further into the rear-view 
of Canadian history, the changing place of evidence and experts in policymaking should 
be examined. Are evidence and experts in policymaking regarded differently under a 
different federal government? How do the values of state actors impact the role of 
evidence today? Additionally, future research could investigate the place of penal 
populism today. What changes, if any, have been made under the current government to 
step away from such punitiveness in criminal justice policymaking? Future studies could 
examine if there has been a shift back from penal populism, and whether these changes 
have been substantial or if they are only rhetorical.   
There is also a need for future research regarding the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act specifically. There is a wealth of literature which anticipated the 
potential dangers and outcomes of the bill (Newell, 2013; Marshall, 2015; Cunningham, 
2014; Lau and Martin, 2012; Jarvis, 2012; The John Howard Society of Manitoba and 
Latimer, 2012; The Northwest Territories Department of Justice, 2012). However, there 
is a lack of research which examines the actual impacts of the bill thus far. At the writing 
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of this thesis, there was only one readily available study which examined the impacts of 
the bill since it was passed in March 2012 (Comack, Fabre, and Burgher, 2015).  
Therefore, there is a great need for studies which examine the impacts of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act today.  
More generally, future research should focus on the complex nature of state actor 
activity and decision-making, and how this complexity impacts policymaking. As pointed 
out in this work, state actors are impacted by a multitude of factors, including their own 
values, the values of their voting base, and their own self-interest. Yet, most studies on 
policymaking tend to underestimate the complexity of state actor activity (Adams and 
Saks, 2018; Saks, 2010). Therefore, further research should focus on how the role of a 
state actor impacts policymaking, beyond the standard implications of the state as an 
instrument of the elite. Future research may find Weberian and neo-Weberian theory 
helpful in teasing out a more nuanced understanding of state actors and their motivations.  
5.6 Conclusion  
This thesis presented a content analysis of the legislative debates in the Safe 
Streets and Communities Act.  The purpose of this study was to discern the major 
symbolic frames within the bill, specifically related to elements of evidence and penal 
populism. The results explored how values guided the policy decisions of state actors. 
For the Conservative party who supported the SSCA, values were premised on an 
individualistic understanding of crime that called for a more punitive approach. 
Opposition members advocated for values which were premised on a societal 
understanding of crime, in which preventative measures were needed over punishment. 
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With the incorporation of a neo-Weberian framework, the findings of this study 
illuminate how the motivations for the inclusion of evidence and ideologies such as penal 
populism, lie with the values and self-interest of state actors. In this sense, state actors 
represented their own criminal justice values in the SSCA. Furthermore, the values of the 
electorate may be prioritized by self-interested state actors, as they seek to gain favour 
with their voting base.  The implications of these findings suggest that the use of 
evidence and ideology in policymaking are valued-based decisions made by state actors. 
Future research should focus on this complex role of the state actors, to better understand 
their place in policymaking.  
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